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The Work of the'Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1942-1943 Term*
I. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
A. PRESCRIPTION
Viator v. Heintz.1 The signing of a judgment constitutes ren-
dition of judgment and the ten year prescription on judgments
does not begin to run until the signature of the judge has been
inscribed.
Prescriptions of ten and thirty years were pleaded in Buckley
v. Catlett,' and while nothing new on the subject is added to the
principles established by Louisiana jurisprudence, the clarity of
expression is helpful and certain statements are hence set forth. In
regard to prescription of ten years acquirendi causa (Article 3478) 3
the court said: "In the mentioned series of conveyances, begin-
ning with Charles A. Connella and ending with defendant, there
was no act that recited a conveyance of the disputed Lot 4. Even
if defendant has possessed such property during a period of 10
years, his possession was not under a deed translative of owner-
ship; hence, the prescription of 10 years acquirendi causa is un-
availing to him."4
Of prescription of thirty years liberandi causa (Article 3548)
the court said: "'an owner of land does not lose his title by pres-
cription by remaining out of possession for any length of time,
unless some one else has been in possession long enough to acquire
the title by prescription. The reason is that an owner has as much
* This symposium has been contributed by the following: Prescription,
Family Law, Expropriation, Successions, Landlord and Tenant, Property,
Partnership, Contracts, Community Property, Particular Contracts, Mineral
Rights-Harriet S. Daggett, Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State Uni-
versity Law School; Torts-W. Frank Gladney, Member of the Baton
Rouge Bar; Criminal Law and Procedure-Dale E. Bennett, Associate Pro-
fessor of Law and Acting Dean, Louisiana State University Law School;
Procedure-Ben R. Downing, Jr., Student, Louisiana State University Law
School.
1. 201 La. 884, 10 So. (2d) 690 (1942).
2. 203 La. 54, 13 So. (2d) 884 (1943).
3. La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Buckley v. Catlett, 203 La. 54, 60, 13 So. (2d) 384, 386 (1943).
5. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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right to remain out of possession as he has to remain in possession
of his property; the only risk of remaining out of possession being
that some one else might be in possession long enough to acquire
title by prescription.' "6
In regard to prescription of thirty years acquirendi causa, it
was stated: "On this subject, it is well established in our juris-
prudence that, for the purpose of claiming land under the pres-
cription of 30 years, several successive possessors cannot be joined
to show a continuous adverse possession, unless there is a privity
of estate or contract between the occupants. The reason for this
rule is that the several acts of adverse possession are construed as
nothing more than a series of independent trespasses, and on the
termination of each of those acts the possession returns by opera-
tion of law to the rightful owner of the immovable. '7
Mere acquiescence on the 'part of the grantor did not establish
a just title even if the grantor did intend to sell the lot in dispute;
but even if it had, title was lost in certain foreclosure proceedings.
Plaintiff's ancestor in Smith v. Southern Kraft Corporation'
had bought a twenty-acre tract from the Standard Lumber Com-
pany in 1903. This title was recorded. In 1906 the Standard Lum-
ber Company gave a quitclaim deed to lands in which the dis-
puted twenty acres were included to the Central Lumber Com-
pany, from which present defendants deriied their title. When
plaintiffs sued to be declared owners of the tract under their rec-
ord title, defendants pleaded a prescriptive title of ten years.
Good faith was proved by virtue of the quitclaim deed which
might show in its no warranty clause a lack of faith in the title by
the seller, but not in the buyer. Consideration other than the one
dollar mentioned in the quitclaim deed was proved by other con-
tracts between the two lumber companies, to which the quitclaim
was collateral. The quitclaim deed was said to be a "just" title as
it would have passed ownership if the vendor had owned the land
which was "quitclaimed." The character of possession was then
discussed. The twenty acres in question were part of a contiguous
tract of two hundred and sixty acres and possession of part was
said to be possession of the whole as mentioned in the title. The
Central Lumber Company had constructed a tram railroad across
the tract, about one-quarter mile from the twenty acres. Taxes
6. Buckley v. Catlett, 203 La. 54, 61, 13 So. (2d) 384, 386 (1943).
7. 203 La. 54, 61, 13 So. (2d) 384, 386 (1943).
8. 202 La. 1019, 13 So. (2d) 335 (1943).
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were paid on the whole tract. What was left of the timber was cut
from the twenty acres. Plaintiffs were aware of all these opera-
tions, yet made no claim until oil was discovered, while defend-
ants and their authors had been in peaceful and uninterrupted
possession which "renders inapplicable the principle of law that
as between conflicting claimants from a common author the pref-
erence shall be given to, him whose title is of the more ancient
date."9
B. FAMILY LAW-
The question to be determined in Succession of Dotson0 was
one of fact, i. e., whether there had been a valid marriage upon
which claims to succession were predicated. In finding against the
marriage the court observed "the lapse of forty years may affect
the memory to such an extent that positive recollections, as to the
happening of an event, will be rejected as faulty when they are
incompatible with circumstantial evidence which points to a more
reasonable conclusion." I ' Appellants had pleaded in the alterna-
tive that, if proof of the marriage failed to convince the court, the
mother's "honest belief" that she was married to deceased should
sustain the marriage as putative. The court said they had failed
to find evidence of "honest belief." The chief justice concurred in
the decree 2 but stated "that the court should reject as unsound the
implication in the plaintiff's alternative demand that if Mary
Seals honestly believed that she was married to Sherman Dotson
the belief would give to their cohabitation the status of a putative
marriage. A putative marriage is one which has been solemnized
with the accustomed ceremonials but which is in fact illegal for
some reason. The decision to the contrary in the Succession of
Marinoni13 ought to be overruled because it is in direct conflict
with the decision rendered in Succession of Cusimano,14 where it
was said:
"As there was no marriage contracted by Mrs. DiGratta and
Cusimano, even a void one, the status that existed between them
cannot be deemed that of a putative marriage, possessing the ef-
fect, even as to Mrs. DiGratta (though it is possible she may have
been in good faith), of a valid marriage, for it is only to the mar-
9. 202 La. 1019, 1036, 13 So. (2d) 335, 340.
10. 202 La. 77, 11 So. (2d) 488 (1942).
11. 202 La. 77, 87, 11 So. (2d) 488, 491.
12. 202 La. 77, 88, 11 So. (2d) 488, 491.
13. 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
14. 173 La. 539, 138 So. 95 (1931).
[Vol. V
1,944] WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 515
riage actually contracted, though null, that the law, where it was
contracted in good faith, attaches to it the civil effects of a valid
marriage. Civ. Code, Arts. 117, 118." 15
The case of State ex rel. Legendre v. Legendre6 is concerned
with evidence to determine the comparative fitness of the father
and mother in order to award custody of a daughter. Prepondera-
tion was in favor of the mother so the father's application for writ
of habeas corpus, granted by the lower court, was dismissed. The
parents seemed to be only voluntarily separated. The facts ad-
duced were exceptionally tawdry.
Facts and figures are the content of Butterworth v. Butter-
worth,17 that divorce alimony might be fixed for a wife and two
children under well-settled provisions of the Code. Injected into
plaintiff's story was the allegation that the former husband had
deliberately severed his very lucrative connections with intent to
deprive the plaintiff of a fair income and that the former husband
was busy spending his money traipsing over the United States
and Mexico with the co-respondent of his divorce suit. These bits
of information were not regarded by the court as pertinent to
the issue and no comments on "alimony strikers" were made. It
was observed by the judge, however, that the wife and children
were still able to maintain the standard of living "to which they
were accustomed," not necessarily a criteria of alimony awards,
so a mental note might have been made by the judge of the hus-
band's apparent decision regarding more play and less work.
A divorced wife claimed back alimony in the Succession of
Mioton,18 and received judgment for part of the sum claimed. She
was found to have agreed to an adjustment some time prior to
the death of her one time husband and hence was held to be
estopped to receive the larger sum claimed.
In Jeanis v. Jeanis,19 the plaintiffs, sons of defendant, failed
to prove that their father was in a senile condition and under the
influence of his niece. Their motive in trying to interdict their
father seemed clearly to be an attempt to prevent his partitioning
property with view of giving them their mother's share, as they
wished to keep the holdings intact.
15. 173 La. 539, 542, 138 So. 95, 96.
16. 201 La. 866, 10 So. (2d) 684 (1942).
17. 203 La. 465, 14 So. (2d) 59 (1943).
18. 201 La. 879, 10 So. (2d) 688 (1942).
19. 202 La. 717, 12 So. (2d) 691 (1943).
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C. EXPROPRIATION
Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson2 0 is concerned
with a review of testimony on property value in expropriating
certain lots. The housing authority appealed from the award as
being too high, but the court did not disturb the sum arrived at
by the jury of free holders. The court stated that rental values
and location must be considered in finding market value said to
be "the price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale be-
tween an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy. '21
The dispute in Texas Pipe Line Company v. National Gasoline
Company of Louisiana, Incorporated,"2 was regarding the amount
to be paid for a right of way for a high pressure gasoline pipe line.
The court accepted the estimate of the jury of free holders under
the customary reliance upon such a jury unless the award is in-
dicative of prejudice in either direction. The value of the land
expropriated was virtually destroyed for sale to home builders as
was the land near the line-known to be dangerous. The jury'
awarded one-half of the estimated value of the land within a
distance of fifty feet and the estimated value of the land occupied
by the line. The estimate was a figure between the highest and
lowest alleged appraisements and on the evidence appeared rea-
sonable and fair.
Four cases, New Orleans v. Larroux, New Orleans v. Cereval-
lo, New Orleans v. Cass, and New Orleans v. Heffie,"3 were con-
solidated in order to arrive at a price per acre of land expropri-
ated for an airport. The jury of free holders had awarded $500.00
per acre and in the light of all the evidence the amount appeared
excessive and was reduced to $400.00 per acre.
D. SUCCESSIONS
Colonel Derby, father of plaintiff in the case Derby v. De Saix
Corporation,"4 made a donation to certain trustees when he estab-
lished in 1921 a trust in favor of his four children. In the act creat-
ing the trust it was stipulated that if the property of the trust
should be bought by the third party then negotiating, the proceeds
20. 203 La. 255, 13 So. (2d) 853 (1943).
21. 203 La. 255, 259, 12 So. (2d) 853, 854 (1943).
22. 203 La. 787, 14 So. (2d) 636 (1943).
23. New Orleans v. Larroux, 203 La. 990, 14 So. (2d) 812 (1943); New Or-
leans v. Cerevallo, 203 La. 998, 14 So. (2d) 814 (1943); New Orleans v. Cass,
203 La. 997, 14 So.(2d) 814 (1943); New Orleans v. Heffle, 203 La. 996, 14 So.
(2d) 814 (1943).
24. 201 La. 1060, 10 So. (2d) 896 (1942).
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from the sale should constitute the property of the trust. The
third party did buy the property but was unable to meet the notes
and after foreclosure the plaintiff received his share of the prop-
erty-the trust having expired. He contracted to sell to the de-
fendant, who now refused to take title because it would be subject
to attack by any forced heir born or adopted by the father of
plaintiff. The court decided that defendant must carry out his
contract to buy, as money and not this property had actually been
donated under the stipulation in the trust. There was a return to
the estate in value and hence not even this remote chance of at-
tack against the property itself by a possible addition to the
original list of forced heirs. Scudder v. Howe2 5 furnished a
parallel for this decision, as therein a similar difficulty was met by
rescinding a donation of property-selling the property and then
donating the proceeds therefrom.
An interesting case of first impression entitled Succession of
Rabouin 26 settled the query, if any, that an annuity was not "in-
surance" and hence had to be reckoned with in computing the
forced portion. The decision is supported by many decisions in
other states of the Union in deciding whether annuities should
fall into the insurance category. The Civil Code of Louisiana con-
tains repeated references to "annuities" and evidently the basic
idea was quite familiar to the redactors. It was urged in this liti-
gation that the annuity in question did not conform to the defini-
tion and references in the Code to the device. The court pointed
out that there was nothing to forbid the contract. The articles
dealing with annuity under "Disposable Portion" were not dis-
cussed. The basic distinction was set out, i. e., that the purchase
of the annuity contract by the deceased had been with funds of
his estate, while death benefits under an insurance policy are
never part of the estate as they do not vest until the death of the
insured. The arguments against computing the residue of an in-
vestment such as an annuity in the forced portions are so weak
as to appear alnost frivolous.
It is rare that litigation arises over the usufruct of a child's
share as provided in Article 2382 for the necessitous widow. Also,
the creation of a usufruct by compromise as permitted by Article
540 is unusual. Both occur in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Com-
pany v. Abdalla,27 the case being framed by suit for cancellation
25. 44 La. Ann. 1103, 11 So. 824 (1892).
26. 201 La. 227, 9 So. (2d) 529 (1942).
27. 203 La. 999, 14 So. (2d) 815 (1943).
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of bond brought by the surety company. After the widow had
filed suit demanding her usufruct of a child's share in usufruct
from the succession, of her deceased husband, her three stepchil-
dren and the tutor of her own minor child reached a compromise
settlement with her for the usufruct of property valued at $5,500.
She applied to plaintiff company for a bond and agreed with
them that the bond when granted might be cancelled at any time.
Now, the bonding company sues to cancel due to their fears of
future loss because the three stepchildren had filed suit to ex-
tinguish the usufruct and claimed large damages because of al-
leged waste by the usufructuary. The defendant, widow, claimed
that the usufruct was a legal one and the bond judicial and hence
not subject to cancellation. The court found the usufruct to have
been created by the compromise settlement-not by law-and the
bond not to have been fixed by a judge. The bond was cancelled
as provided in its execution and as justified by the filing of suit
for damages against the widow.
The widow, in Succession of Aymond,18 had signed an agree-
ment with the heirs of deceased, children by a previous marriage,
accepting some household furniture in full settlement of her claim
against the estate for $1,000 under Article 3252. While fraud was
not proved, the court found that she had signed this paper under
the belief that the deceased had left the furniture and $100 while
in fact he had an estate of around $2,000. The largest item was a
postal savings certificate of which the widow knew nothing. The
court found the agreement to be not a compromise but a contract
of acceptance of a thing in payment of a sum due and that this
contract was void because of her error-the motive being to take
the furniture as she could get nothing else. The stated value of
the furniture in the contract was $1,000 which was immaterial
since that was not the "reality of the cause" or "the motive" for
making the contract under Article 1824. The widow, proving her
necessitous condition, received $700, since her own evaluation of
the furniture was $300, though the testimony of a furniture dealer
thought it worth even less.
Futch v. Holloway29 was a suit to close a series of "irregular
proceedings" wherein the tutor of a minor child was attempting
to gain control of his daughter's property inherited from her
mother, the divorced wife of the tutor, in the hands of the de-
28. 202 La. 469, 12 So. (2d) 233 (1943).
29. 202 La. 892, 13 So. (2d) 256 (194$).
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ceased's executor. The court rendered a judgment instructing the
executor to obtain a court order to sell such property of the suc-
cession as needed to pay debts, render a final account of his seven
years of administration and turn over the property belonging to
the minor to the tutor. The executor was a brother of the deceased
and, since he appeared to be the only creditor of the succession,
was continuing to control the minor's property by failing to pay
debts and render a final account.
The case of Succession of Berdon0 presents a most interesting
application of the rules of testate distribution. Deceased left a
widow, a sister, and three children of a deceased brother. The
residuum of his estate was given to them in equal thirds. The
trouble arose over the particular legacies. The codicil of his will
revoked a particular legacy to the children and substituted an-
other particular legacy, i. e., five hundred shares of Whitney Na-
tional Bank stock. A particular legacy to his wife in the body of
the will was also of five hundred shares of Whitney stock. More
shares were included in particular legacies in the body of the will,
bringing the total number of such shares finally bequeathed to
twelve hundred while he never had owned but seven hundred
seventy-five shares of Whitney stock. The widow pleaded that all
of these particular legacies were valid and hence thatthe executor
should purchase enough to make up the deficiency or pay in cash
or distribute proportionately the seven hundred seventy-five
shares. The children pleaded that the' testator had contradicted
himself and that his last bequest in the codicil should rule, as it in-
dicated a tacit revocation of the first bequests. The trial judge so
ruled, citing Article 1723, and held that the widow as the first par-
ticular legatee of this stock should lose to the other two legatees
and thus receive but seventy-five shares. The supreme court in the
ruling opinion took the position that there was no contradiction
as the three bequests in question, while particular legacies, were
not legacies of particular objects and that there could be no tacit
revocation unless the last disposition was contrary to the former.
It was pointed out that had there been twelve hundred shares in
the estate, no question of payment of the three particular legacies
would have arisen and that there was a shortage in stock and not
a contradiction in legacies of stock. The court found no authority
in the Code for purchasing more stock or making a legacy of
money when stock had been specified. Article 1635 was invoked
30. 202 La. 607, 12 So. (2d) 654 (1943).
1944]
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to decide that the seven hundred seventy-five shares must be dis-
tributed proportionately among the three legatees. The decision
seems sound from an equitable standpoint, but the court's deci-
sion that Whitney Bank stock is not a particular object and the
application of Article 1635 which seems clearly to indicate the
proportionate method only so far as sums of money are concerned
seems questionable. If the testator had made three separate be-
quests of a Chippendale table and had only two-a contradiction
and resort to Article 1723 would seem clear. If he had had only five
hundred shares of Whitney stock and had made two separate be-
quests of five hundred shares, the situation would seem clearer.
If he had fifty shares of Whitney, fifty shares of T & T and had
made bequests of each, they would seem particularized as to ob-
ject. Just because an odd amount appeared it seems a doubtful
precedent to consider as money all types of stock, bonds, etc. Sup-
pose a testator said in his will "I want A to have my bonds" and
in a codicil he said, "I want B to have my bonds" would that not
be considered contradictory? With high respect to a brilliant jus-
tice, the writer humbly thinks him in error in this analysis.
The Succession -of Homan3l was decided on the same day and
with the same author of the majority opinion as Succession of
Berdon12 Hence, it would be logical to assume that on similar
points, the attitude of mind should be the same. Having quickly
disposed of the well-settled principle that any one of the several
forms of will properly carried out is valid, whether the same form
is followed in will and codicil or not, the court gave lengthy con-
sideration to the issue of whether several bequests were cumula-
tive or disjunctive. Testator left a will with three codicils. The
second codicil gave to Dell, one of the defendants, thirty shares
of "homestead stock" and to Edna, another defendant, twenty
shares of "homestead stock." The third codicil gave to Dell thirty
shares of "Security Homestead Stock" and to Edna twenty shares
of "Guaranty Homestead Stock." The court found no revocation
-no incompatibility-no contrary intention and hence a cumula-
tion and Dell was awarded sixty shares and Edna forty shares-
decedent having plenty of homestead stock to meet the bequests
-not the case in Succession of Berdon. The decision treats stock
as money quoting from Dimitry v. Shreveport Mutual Building
Association3 to the effect that "paid-up shares of stock in a build-
31. 202 La. 591, 12 So. (2d) 649 (1943).
32. 202 La. 607, 12 So. (2d) 654 (1943).
33. 167 La. 875, 120 So. 581 (1929).
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ing or homestead association are merely deposits of sums of money
at a fixed rate of interest subject to withdrawal at any time."'8 4
This could scarcely be said as to Whitney Bank stock-the subject
in Su~cession of Berdon-though the principle involved must
have influenced the decision on the point of "particular objects,"
not of importance in the case under discussion as there was
enough to satisfy the bequests and the stock was homestead
stock. The instant case overruled by name the cases of Robouam's
Heirs v. Robouam's Executor35 and Succession of Mercer" to
which the chief justice particularly dissented. There was other
phraseology in these two cases upon which they might have been
distinguished under the interpretation rules but the majority of
the court seemed to feel that they stood for the flat proposition
that all double legacies of same amounts to the same legatees
must be held to be repetitious and indicative of tacit revocation-
not necessarily the case, certainly. The decision, however, is care-
fully reasoned and intellectually satisfying.
In Succession 'of Torlage" certain questions were asked Tor-
lage as part of the ritual of masonic initiation. His answers were
in writing and at the end of the questionnaire appear these words:
"Signed at New Orleans, on this 21st day of the month of Novem-
ber A. D. 1938, W. T. Torlage." Then the applicant was asked to
"write now, in good faith, your last will and testament, precisely
as if you were about immediately to be engaged in battle, and
expected to fall in the action." In compliance the writer set forth
the following: "'I hereby leave all I owne to my wife and that my
request is that I be laid to rest with Masonic rights. Henry
William Torlage.' ,,38
The wife offered this document in probate and the attack on
its validity was made by the children of deceased by a first mar-
riage. The court held the document invalid as an olographic will
because the portion claimed to have been "a testament" was not
dated and the writer did not intend the document as a will but
only as part of the ritual and what his will "would be" if he had
been in the circumstances described, etc. It does not appear how
the paper came into the hands of the wife, all of which might
have had a bearing on the intention of the testator who had writ-
34. Succession of Homan, 202 La. 591, 605, 12 So. (2d) 649, 653 (1943).
35. 12 La.,73 (1838).
36. 28 La. Ann. 564 (1876).
37. 202 La. 693, 12 So. (2d) 683 (1943).
38. 202 La. 693, 696, 12 So. (2d) 683, 684.
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ten in very serious vein after having made solemn answers re-
garding his beliefs on First Cause, the state of his conscience, etc.,
and who might have intended the document as his will. He
gave directions for his burial service. The circumstances under
which a will were written are not ordinarily considered when the
instrument's contents disclose the thought of death. The date did
appear in the identical paper. The whole decision appears highly
doubtful from the brief account at least and again impresses the
student with the thought that the safeguards thrown around wills
to insure the carrying out of wishes of the deceased as often
appear rather to prevent as to guarantee the result. However, the
opinion of the lower court was affirmed and the reviewer might
well have rested upon the fact that first impressions of litigants
and their sincerity are most significant in doubtful situations.
In Succession of Wallis,3 9 the following clause of a will was
declared invalid except for appointment of executor. "Regarding
a memorial hall or room and the residue of my estate I have given
full instructions to Trist Wood whom I make executor of my will."
This decision was within the clear words of the prohibitions
of the Civil Code against verbal testaments and against giving an
intermediary or agent the right to actually dispose ° and was well
supported by many previous judgments of the supreme court.
An interpretation of a will is involved in Succession of
Price.41 There were no forced heirs. The controversy arose over
the following portions of the testament. The testatrix first stated
that "all my debt, if any, shall be paid." Then followed a long list
of bequests of $1,000.00 each to two generations of nieces and
nephews. Afterwards came the following passage. "'All the rest
of my estate of whatever description and wheresoever situated I
give and bequeath, One Half to my niece and namesake Anna
Gay Butler Plater, or if she is not living, this one half of my estate
is to be divided equally among her children, Richard C. Plater,
Jr., and Louise Plater Hale.
"'One fourth of my estate. I give and bequeath to my great
niece and namesake Margaret Price Weaver, if she survives me.
"'After all these bequests heretofore bequeathed in this will
are carried out and all indebtedness paid then I wish the balance
of my estate to be divided equally between all my nieces and
39. 203 La. 874, 14 So. (2d) 749 (1943)'.
40. Arts. 1573-1596, La. Civil Code of 1870.
41. 202 La. 842, 13 So. (2d) 240 (1943).
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nephews, great nieces and nephews .... , 42 The executors pro-
posed to pay out of the residue, after the debts of decedent and
the special bequests were paid the one-half of this residue to Mrs.
Plater and one-fourth to Mrs. Price and then, out of the remaining
one-fourth to pay taxes and other charges against the succession,
thus leaving no balance to be further distributed to other nieces
and nephews. Opponents insisted that the debts of both decedent
and her succession and the special legacies be paid first and then
the balance be divided into one-half and two-quarters and given
to the designated legatees under universal title. After careful re-
view of all parts of the testament in searching for the testator's
intention and a full citation of pertinent Code articles and cases,
the court decided with the executor.
At least four points of major interest occur in Maddox v.
Butchee.4 3 The will in question was written as follows:
"'March 3, 1941
"'At my Death I donate and bequeath all the property I
then own to my husband Wesley Maddox after his death it is
to go to my great niece Johnnie Tilley'
"(Signed) 'Bella B. Maddox."'"
(1) The court very properly declared this bequest to be a
prohibited substitution under Article 1520, attempting to give full
ownership for life to one person who must pass it to another
designated by the original testator. A full and unbroken line of
decision support this position. (2) Since a sale and repurchase of
land by the deceased was shown to have been without considera-
tion and a pure simulation, title remained in the separate estate
of the deceased and never vested in the community between the
deceased and her surviving husband. (3) There was no cause to set
aside a partition due to failure to make an owner of one-half of
the minerals a party to the suit since the judgment specifically
protected the owner of the mineral rights, interpreted by the
judge of the lower court as a servitude, though improperly termed
a mineral royalty, between which, as the justice remarked, there
is "a vast distinction." (4) The most interesting point, perhaps, is
in regard to the matter of prescription of the right of a surviving
42. 202 La. 842, 846, 13 So. (2d) 240, 241.
43. 203 La. 299, 14 So. (2d) 4 (1943).
44. 203 La. 299, 306, 14 So. (2d) 4, 6.
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spouse to claim the marital portion under Article 2382. The lower
court had held this right to have prescribed because it had not
been claimed within the three months after opening of succession
according to Article 3275. The supreme court pointed out that this
claim is neither that of a creditor nor a legatee under the words
of Article 3275 but is a legal bounty to which Article 3275 does not
apply. Cases were cited ruling that this claim may be made as an
opposition to the final act of an administrator or after liquidation
of the estate or "even after the property of the succession has
been received by the heirs."4 When, if ever, the right would
prescribe was not stated. This claim was held to have been made
in time in a suit to annul a judgment ordering sale by partition
after heirs had been put into possession by judgment.
E. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Selber Brothers, Incorporated v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores6
again reached the supreme court on' a plea of estoppel having pre-
viously been sent down after overruling an exception of no cause
of action. 7 The contract in question was a lease with flat monthly
rental plus a percentage over a stipulated nine months sales per-
centage. The court had previously declared that there was an
implied obligation on part of lessee to conduct the business in a
manner which would reasonably produce more than the flat
rental. The lessee leased another building and during the latter
part of the term of the lease in question sold only "odds and
ends" so that the profits naturally fell from the previous level.
This was found to have been a breach of the implied obligation
and lessor was awarded the excess in line with profits of the
same months of the preceding year. Estoppel was pleaded on the
ground that lessor had cashed the checks for the minimum rent
and had thus taken that sum in accord and satisfaction. The
court found that not to be the case. The adjustment had continued
all the while in regard to the claim for the additional amount
and the checks were not sent or accepted on condition that they
constituted a settlement of the part of the account in dispute.
The well-known principle that the movables of a third person
are not subject to seizure under the lessor's privilege, giving this
right to a lessor against his tenant-unless the property of the
45. 203 La. 299, 313, 14 So. (2d) 4, 8.
46. 203 La. 316, 14 So. (2d) 10 (1943).
47. 194 La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940).
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third person is found to be contained in a building upon the
leased premises-was again applied in Boone v. Brown.4 8 The
chattel in question was a trailer, parked on a vacant lot rented by
the tenant who had also rented the trailer from intervenor.
A lessor instituted summary ejectment proceedings under
Act 200 of 1936 in Meraux & Nunez, Incorporated v. Houck.49 The
court patiently went over the many clauses of the written lease,
digested the evidence of its modifications and affirmed the judg-
ment ordering the lessee to vacate after receipt of the sum owed
him by lessor for improvements.
F. PROPERTY
Board of Commissioners of Buras Levee District v. Perez,
District Attorney; Board of Commissioners of Lake Borgne Levee
District v. Same; Board of Commissioners of Grand Prairie Levee
District v. Same.50 Plaintiffs had employed special'counsel under
a resolution declaring a real need for such assistance and now
seek to enjoin the district attorney from interfering with the
duties of the specially employed counsel. The district attorney in-
voked the provisions of Act 125 of 1912 as amended by Act 182 of
1940 which forbids the employment by parish boards of special
counsel to attend to any but very special assignments and where
"a real necessity exists." The court was concerned with a review
of voluminous evidence from which they found that there was
no real necessity for employment of counsel.
In Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Commission,5' the court
affirmed judgment for damages to property caused by the build-
ing of a bridge which resulted in a narrowing of the street-
necessitated a one-way traffic, etc. The appraisement of deprecia-
tion of property value was grounded on reduced rental values.
Property owners were allowed five per cent per annum from date
of judicial demand. The highway commission was charged with
cost of taking testimony. The first attempt 52 to recover these
damages resulted in a non-suit since the action was prematurely
brought before completion of the bridge and prior to the time
48. 201 La. 917, 10 So. (2d) 701 (1942).
49. 202 La. 820, 13 So. (2d) 233 (1942).
50. 202 La. 655, 12 So. (2d) 670 (1943).
51. 202 La. 345, 11 So. (2d) 612 (1942).
52. Kuhn v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 174 La. 990, 142 So. 149
(1932).
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when a non-speculative estimate of the damages could be deter-
mined.
Exceptions were overruled and the case remanded in Keller
v. Haas.53 Plaintiff was attempting to recover his three-fourths
interest in certain land together with rentals that had accrued.
Defendant claimed the property under a tax deed of 1915. The
court observed in overruling the exceptions of no right and no
cause of action that while "a co-owner cannot be compelled to
redeem or re-acquire" his property and has an option in the mat-
ter, nevertheless, he cannot sleep on his rights awaiting the de-
velopment of the property but must act within a reasonable time
in seeking equity, the principle underlying his right. Since equit-
able considerations were involved "no hard and fast rule can be
laid down," hence the merits must be inquired into. The court also
stated the doctrine that where an individual is practically the sole
owner of a corporation, the case here, "he may not use the screen
of corporate entity to absolve himself from responsibility.""
G. PARTNERSHIP
Another chapter of McCann v. Todd55 was concluded by judi-
cial distribution of the impounded receipts from the "contingent
fee" in controversy. The plaintiff's plea of verbal contract on def-
inite percentage basis was not proved nor was the defendant's
plea of a quantum meruit understanding. A "joint venture" was
said to have been undertaken and copious authority was cited for
the proposition that in absence of special agreement the joint
venturors should share equally. However, since one of the plain-
tiffs had claimed only thirty per cent, he could receive but that
amount under Article 156 of the Code of Practice. The thirty-
three and one-third per cent due this plaintiff but not asked for
by him was split between the other two venturors. Justice Hig-
gins agreed with the majority on the joint venture analysis but
dissented firmly from the refusal to grant a rehearing for adjust-
ment of the award which in the "gift" of the three and one-third
per cent was in the teeth of the award in "joint venture" as well
as the clear language of Article 155 of the Code of Practice which
denies the awarding of more than due as strongly as does Article
156 the awarding of more than was asked.
53. 202 La. 486, 12 So. (2d) 238 (1943).
54. 202 La. 486, 492, 12 So. (2d) 238, 240.
55. 203 La. 631, 14 So. (2d) 469 (1943).
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H. CONTRACTS
A son sued his mother in Whitney National Bank of New Or-
leans v. Schwab58 to set aside a sale to her of his one-eighth in-
terest in community property of his deceased father on the
ground of his incapacity at the time. He also attempted to stop
the bank's foreclosure on this property. The lower court found
his sale to his mother void but saved the right of the bank as a
mortgage creditor. The supreme court found his act of sale at
sixteen invalid but, since his marriage fully emancipated him
when he reached eighteen, prescription had run against his right
to ask for rescission and the mortgage on the land by his mother
to the bank was enforceable.
Thirty pages of the Southern Reporter evidence the full and
careful consideration of the problem in Baton Rouge Building
Trades Council v. T. L. James & Company, Incorporated.7 The
result is a five to four decision in favor of the plaintiff labor union
with injunctive relief against further maintenance of an open
shop. Labor and management with the assistance of the State
Commissioner of Labor, after many conferences, had signed a
paper purporting to indicate the lines of operation. In considera-
tion of management's accession to the stipulation the union was to
call off an impending strike. Management contended that the
paper was not a contract but agenda to be used as a basis of con-
tinued negotiations. The majority of the court decided after thor-
ough review of the mass of evidence that the parties had con-
tracted, that the contract was breached by management, that
there was authority in the court for relief, and that the specific
performance asked for should be granted. Articles 1926 through
1929 together with a list of Louisiana cases of application as well
as decisions from other jurisdictions were cited for authority. The
dissenting justices took the view that through misunderstanding
the minds of the parties had never met and hence there was no
contract to be enforced.
Barraque v. Neff5 8 was a suit' upon a building contract of
which the following excerpt was the essence: "[the contractor]
shall remedy any defects due to faulty materials or workmanship
which appear within a period of one year from the date of com-
pletion of the contract." Defects did appear within the year be-
56. 203 La. 175, 13 So. (2d) 782 (1943).
57. 201 La. 749, 10 So. (2d) 606 (1942).
58. 202 La. 360, 11 So., (2d) 697 (1942).
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cause of the use of "super-rock" which absorbs moisture in this
climate, if not waterproofed. The question became one of "whether
the mistake of using super-rock, in the way in which it was used"
was "attributable to the contractor or to the plaintiff." No archi-
tect had been employed. The building inspector was responsible
only to see that the specifications were carried out and not in
an advisory capacity. It was proved that the contractor had made
the plans and urged the use of super-rock and hence he was held
liable. Cases where an architect or the owner himself had made
the plans and specifications were distinguished. The liability was
the amount proved by the owner to have been spent in having
the house brick veneered and refinished, said to be the only prac-
tical and permanent method of water-proofing. The amount
claimed for the less attractive appearance of the house was said
to have been off-set by the fact that the claimants now had a brick
veneered instead of a stucco house.
Aside from procedural points discussed elsewhere in this jour-
nal and several minor issues, the case of Boxwell v. Department
of Highways59 is concerned with a most interesting problem of
recovery or non on certain items of over $500 not advertised and
let in accordance with Act 73 of 1926 as amended by Act 20 of
1935, fourth extra session,60 and hence-under the terms of the
statute-null and void. The problem was whether recovery should
be allowed on a quantum meruit basis as there was no fraud and
actual delivery of the goods to the state's representatives was
proved. Authority was cited for the proposition that no recovery
at all should be allowed as such a circumvention would allow the
very thing prohibited in the interest of the public to prevent
favoritism-exhorbitance-waste, etc. The situation was not
fraught with evil in itself however-not malum per se. The civil
law is firm on the subject of unjust enrichment which would
have inured to the state's benefit. The court, consequently, took an
equitable view and awarded, the vendors of the goods their costs
value without profit-as status quo could not be achieved as the
materials had been consumed or incorporated.
Furlow v. Westover Realty Company"1 deals with a digest of
many facts bearing upon interpretation and effect of a certain
contract because of which plaintiff was attempting to recover
attorney fees from defendant company. The summary is well
59. 203 La. 760, 14 So. (2d) 627 (1943).
60. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6730-6737.
61. 203 La. 731, 14 So. (2d) 618 (1943).
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achieved by the brief syllabus repeated here. "Where attorney
was not a party to defendant's agreement to pay fees owed by
another to attorney and attorney was to benefit from the agree-
ment only upon complete performance thereof by the other who
did not perform, attorney was not entitled to recover from de-
fendant on the agreement."82
Act 298 of 19383 was applied in Louisiana Delta Farms Com-
pany v. Davis64 to permit plaintiffs to regain possession of their
properties occupied by persons who had breached their contracts
to buy. These were bond for deed contracts so the ten years pre-
scription of Article 3544 applied in suits to set aside sales of real
estate for the non-payment of the purchase price was not ruling.
Not even interest payments had been met so it could not be said
that occupants' payments exceeded "a fair rental value for the
property" pleaded to void the forfeiture clause of the contract.
The case of Moran v. Bechtel"5 is concerned with a review of
evidence resulting in the decision that certain property was not
included in a tax sale alleged to have contained it but was a
"separate and distinct piece of land" and further that actual phys-
ical possession to satisfy the thirty-year prescription plea had not
been satisfactorily proved. Having found a dedication by map
and purchase in reliance thereon the court stated that the fact
that the property had not been put to actual use by public au-
thorities did not invalidate the dedication and take title out of
the public. Moreover, mere payment of taxes by a private party
did not preclude the city from claiming land previously dedicated
when needed for streets. As the city had not been a party to cer-
tain previous suits pleaded as a res adjudicata to the present con-
troversy and the issues involved had not been the same, the res
adjudicata plea was held not to have been well founded.
Bourgeois v. Bourgeois66 records an attempt by one set of
children against another to set aside certain sales made by their
father to the defendants on the ground of fraud and simulation.
The opinion is necessarily concerned with evaluation of facts as
revealed by the evidence, resulting in partial success for plain-
tiffs and finding a bona fide sale with consideration in another
sale. The matter of lesion was not raised by the pleadings so was
62. Ibid.
63. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6606.1-6606.8.
64. 202 La. 445, 12 So. (2d) 213 (1942).
65. 202 La. 380, 12 So. (2d) 1 (1942).
66. 202 La. 578, 12 So. (2d) 278 (1943).
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not passed upon by the court and inheritance tax matters and
accounting of disposal of the movables of the deceased were prop-
erly left to be settled in succession proceedings.
Plaintiffs in Goldberg v. Martin 7 had advanced money to a
third party to enable him to make the cash down payment in
purchasing a restaurant from defendant which the latter re-
bought very soon thereafter, realizing a large profit through the
two deals. Plaintiffs claimed that the Bulk Sales Act was not com-
plied with when Martin bought back the restaurant, no notices
having been sent to them, etc. The court held that the Bulk Sales
Act did apply under its broad terms "the transfer in bulk ...
shall be void as against the creditors of the transferor, unless
made in conformity with the provisions of this Act." Defendant
was held "liable as receiver for the value of the property ($12,000)
transferred by the act" and judgment was given against him for
the amounts loaned by plaintiffs to the first purchaser and subse-
quent vendor to defendant.
I. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
As expected, -the case of Succession of Wiener 8 naturally
elicited a strong opinion upholding the decision of the lower
court denying the right of the state to tax the inheritance of a
father's half of the community upon the valuation of the whole
community including the half belonging to the surviving widow.
The problem was approached from various angles, all denying
with full authority the right to tax one person on a basis of the
value of property of another and supporting the theory of the
presently vested interest of the wife's share in the community,
thought to have been settled for tax purposes by the leading case
of Bender v. Pfaf 6' together with other decisions of the United
States Supreme Court of equal importance. Attorney for the
United States appeared as amicus curiae in this case as the United
States Revenue Act of 1942 includes the whole community in the
taxable estate of a decedent and was of course the root of the issue
as the state tax collector's duty under statute instructs him to
collect at least eighty per cent of the estate tax payable to the
United States. Under present conditions, it would appear highly
doubtful that the United States Supreme Court as presently con-
stituted will take the same view of this question as repeatedly
67. 203 La. 70, 13 So. (2d) 465 (1943).
68. 203 La. 649, 14 So. (2d) 475 (1943).
69. 282 U. S. 127, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252 (1930).
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expressed by their predecessors and by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana on many occasions hence the urgent need for immedi-
ate legislation to protect in part and as far as possible against a
probable decision adverse to Louisiana community property tax
interests. That the authors of the congressional act of 1942 would
deliberately invite or virtually demand a review of previous
United States Supreme Court decisions in this subject by writing
in the section of the revenue bill in question would indicate that
hopes of reversal were entertained. The tax in this succession to
the state alone on this eighty per cent would amount to almost
twice its amount if levied on the whole community rather than
on the half actually owned under Louisiana law by the decedent.
The citizens of the nine community property states naturally
await with anxious interest the test of the federal statute by
federal courts.
Ferguson v. Hayes' Heirs° raised the question of the con-
stitutionality of Section 34 of Act 140 of 193271 which makes cer-
tain shares of stock bought in the name of a wife her separate
property. The question reached the court on a rule brought against
collateral heirs to show cause why seventeen shares of stock in
the Crowley Building and Loan Association should not be declared
community property. The court again ruled that the section of
the Louisiana Constitution of 192172 requiring each law to have
but one object and that the title of the act shall state that object
does not mean that the title must be "a complete index to every
section of the statute" 73 but that a general statement is sufficient.
Furthermore, Section 34, in question, was mentioned in the title.
The constitutional prohibition on passage of special laws and on
changing the law of descent or succession was also raised and
Act 34 of 1932 was of course said to be of general application to
all married women. Since the ninety-day period provided in the
statute for attack on any purchase of stock by a married woman
had run and the act was constitutional on all counts, the stock
in litigation was held to have been the separate property of the
deceased wife.
In Cupples v. Harris7 1 the following description.was held in-
sufficient to identify the property in question. "'Sec. 29 Township
70. 202 La. 810, 13 So. (2d) 223 (1943).
71. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.2.
72. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16.
73. 202 La.'.810, 817, 13 So. (2d) 223, 225.
74. 202 La. 336, 11 So. (2d) 609 (1942).
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Ten N R 3 East North of Red River Land District, said interest
being One Half of said Eighty (80) acres of land... . ,,75
Furthermore, the rule of Ford v. EdenboM 7 and Brewer v.
HillJ7 7 was relied upon to decide that property entered during the
community but certified by the government after dissolution of
the community was the separate property of the surviving spouse.
In First National Bank of Abbeville v. Broussard7 8 defend-
ant, during the existence of the community, became an accom-
modation endorser on three notes. After dissolution of the com-
munity by death of his wife he received the three notes in return
for a new note secured by mortgage on the property of the com-
munity. The bank now seeks to execute this mortgage and satisfy
the obligation and the wife's heirs intervene. It was held that the
defendant was without right to bind the heirs of his wife by
mortgaging their share of the community property. The heirs had
accepted the succession of defendant's wife unconditionally but
were not made parties to the suit on the note. Right to sue the
heirs was reserved by the majority opinion. Justice McCaleb con-
curred in the result but objected to the following statement found
in the majority opinion: "From, the facts in this case, it is readily
seen that Ursin B. Broussard has changed the liability on the
community obligation, as it existed at the time of his wife's death,
from that of an accommodation endorser of the three notes to a
primary obligation on his part as maker of the mortgage note,
which he has attempted to secure by a special mortgage on the
community property, an undivided one-half interest of which is
owned by the intervenors as the heirs of Marie Rosa Brous-
sard... .117"1 Justice McCaleb pointed out that the original notes
provided that makers and endorsers bound themselves in solido.
Hence, the execution of the new note did not make the debt more
onerous, as the community was primarily responsible already, nor
was the giving of a new note for the old one a novation under
Studebaker Brothers Manufacturing Company v. Endom.8 0
The court stated in Normand v. Daviss' that they could not
"intelligently" pass upon the plea of estoppel with the documents
and evidence before them and remanded the case, referring the
75. 202 La. 336, 341, 11 So. (2d) 609, 610.
76. 142 La. 927, 77 So. 851 (1918).
77. 178 La. 533, 152 So. 75 (1933).
78. 202 La. 315, 11 So. (2d) 602 (1942).
79. 202 La. 315, 320, 11 So. (2d) 602, 603.
80. 51 La. Ann. 1263, 26 So. 90, 72 Am. St. Rep. 489 (1899).
81. 202 La. 565, 12 So. (2d) 273 (1942).
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plea of estoppel to the merits. Therefore, comment also may well
be deferred until a new presentation is available in the reports.
J. PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
In Pease v. Getti, 2. plaintiff gave a first mortgage to the Fed-
eral Land Bank and a second mortgage to the Farm Loan Asso-
ciation of which he was a member and of which defendant was
secretary and treasurer. Defendant instituted foreclosure proceed-
ings and after appearance of advertisement but before the sale
entered into an agreement with a third person whereby defend-
ant was to receive $3,000 over and above the amounts of the two
mortgages and the third person was to get the land at the sale. All
of this took place according to arrangement. Plaintiff now de-
mands the $3,000 and the judgment, affirming that of the lower
court, awarded him an accounting for the $3,000 note, which de-
fendant had received in payment by assignment from the third
party. The court reiterated the established principle that "where
there is an agreement to stifle competition at judicial sales and
where one of the parties to the agreement is a party to the pro-
ceedings, the sale may be annulled by the injured party."83 The
fact that plaintiff was present at the sale and theoretically at least
could have protected himself did not relieve defendant of the
duty of informing plaintiff of the third party's intention to bid
particularly since they were not dealing at arms' length due to
defendant's official position in the organization of which plaintiff
was a member and the organization's supposed purpose to assist
its members in their difficulties.
"Only a question of law is involved" said the court in the case
of Southern Enterprises, Incorporated v. Foster."' A chattel mort-
gage had been recorded in the Parish of Rapides, the mortgagor's
domicile, but the question of whether another recordation was
necessary to affect third persons was at issue. The mortgagee
signed the documents involved in Ouachita Parish and one of the
subscribing witnesses appeared before a notary in Ouachita and
proved the signatures of both parties. The chattel mortgage
holder as against the lessor took the position that "it was not
necessary for the mortgagee to sign the chattel mortgage; that
the mortgage was valid without his signature; that it was created
when the act of mortgage was signed by the mortgagor in the
82. 202 La. 698, 12 So. (2d) 684 (1942).
83. 202 La. 698, 714, 12 So. (2d) 684, 690.
84. 203 La. 133, 13 So. (2d) 491 (1943).
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Parish of Rapides where the mortgagor resided, and therefore
that the recordation of the act in the Parish of Rapides was suf-
ficient. ' 85 After discussing the jurisprudence making it clear that
while the mortgagee does not have to sign the act of mortgage,
he does have "to perform some, affirmative act to indicate his
acceptance." The lower court stated that affirmative acts were
performed in the Parish of Ouachita and the mortgage was ac-
knowledged before the notary in the Parish of Ouachita and
hence under the law it had to be recorded in Ouachita in order
to affect the lessor who was without actual notice. On the notice
point the language of the opinion indicates that actual notice
would bind the third person even in absence of recordation which
seems at variance with the court of appeal view of the matter."
Suit was brought to compel the recorder of mortgages to
cancel the inscription on certain property. The court held in La-
coste v. Hickey87 that the mortgage must be cancelled and no
indemnity bond need be furnished to protect the recorder88 as
the following facts were sufficiently proved. These facts were
"that the notes were given for a specific purpose; that their pay-
ment was anticipated as provided in the contract; that they were
paid to the original holder who delivered them to. the makers; that
by their payment both notes and mortgage were extinguished;
that the notes themselves were marked paid, and that they were
actually destroyed by the makers. 8 9 Since the notes were de-
stroyed by relators, necessitating the filing of this suit, costs were
levied upon them.
Madison Lumber Company v. Helm0 was "a suit by the fur-
nisher of materials used in the repair and remodeling of a build-
ing to recover from the owner the value thereof, with recognition
of the materialman's lien and privilege on the building and prem-
ises." Plaintiff insisted that the court had no power to review
appellate decisions where only questions of fact were at issue and
the chief justice dissented on that ground while the majority of
the court took jurisdiction under the Constitution's words9' "any
case," while stating, however, that their custom was to refrain
from so doing when questions of fact only were involved. The
85. 203 La. 133, 141, 13 So. (2d) 491, 493.
86. See Krivos v. Simmons, 134 So. 727 (La. App. 1931); Comment (1932)
7 Tulane L. Rev. 128.
*87. 203 La. 794, 14 So.(2d) 639 (1948).
88. Art. 2279, La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. Lacoste v. Hickey, 203 La. 794, 801, 14 So. (2d) 639, 641 (1943).
90. 202 La. 1061, 13 So. (2d) 349 (1943).
91. La. Const. of 1921, Art., VII, § 11.
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contractor had given the money paid him by the owner of the
building to the materialman now attempting to collect from the
owner, and the materialman had applied the sum to old debts of
the contractor's instead of to the bill presently claimed. The court
stated that while ordinarily the creditor may apply payment as
he pleases if uninstructed by the debtor, he cannot do so if he
knows that it would be in fraud of a third person. Futhermore,
the court found that the debtor, contractor, had instructed the
materialman to pay the account of materials furnished in this job
whence he derived the funds rather than to the old debts. The
lower court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit was affirmed.
Smith v. Bratsos (Allied Store Utilities Company, Inter-
venor) 92 recites another contest between a lessor and holder of
chattel mortgage. The property in question was a refrigerator
upon which the mortgage had been taken and recorded at time of
purchase order and before the article was placed in the leased
building. However, the serial numbers were inserted after the
execution of the mortgage and were disregarded by the court in
arriving at a decision on the question of proper description. The
court referred to the case of Union Building Corporation v. Bur-
meister9 3 and the excerpts cited therein from Jones on Chattel
Mortgages and Conditional Sales" and held that the description
without serial numbers was sufficient "with the aid of inquiries
which it would suggest to identify the chattel." Oral evidence was
admissible under the Jones comment to determine circumstances,
etc. The fact that the lessee had violated a clause of the lease
providing that no property upon which chattel mortgages were
outstanding was to be placed on the leased premises was said to
give cause for cancellation of the lease but not to affect the rights
of the chattel mortgage holder.
The case seems to relax the strictness with which the courts
have been applying the description clause in cases where the ob-
ject has a serial number, as an automobile, for example. The
chattel mortgage act being a graft upon the civil law has been
very strictly interpreted and the common law rule of identifica-
tion proved by outside evidence of circumstances, etc., has not
been looked upon with favor in interpreting the "full description"
clause of the Louisiana statute.9 5
92. 202 La. 493, 12 So. (2d) 245 (1942).
93. 186 La. 1027, 173 So. 752 (1937).
94. Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (Bower's ed. 1933).
95. See Daggett, Louisiana Privileges and Chattel Mortgage (1942) 44 et
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K. MINERAL RIGHTS
Hunter Company v. McHugh96 is concerned and at length
with the question of constitutionality of the latest of conservation
statutes, Act 157 of 1940, 9 7 which provides in addition to the usual
well known regulations, for compulsory unitization for preven-
tion of waste in the large sense including the idea of preservation
of pressure to insure the possibility of maximum recovery. The
principle of delegation of legislative powers to be exercised in
conformity with a reasonably well defined pattern should be too
well established and too deeply incorporated in our constitutional
form of government to have deserved the time and space and
copious review of authorities which the court was generous
enough to give. The method, procedure, due process and scientific
basis of the compulsory pooling act were rightly sustained, which
is good news to those who looked with pride upon the progres-
sive statute which had received much favorable comment from
those who had an informed interest in modern large scale con-
servation of this so valuable resource. All of the justices were in
a[ccord in their approval of the statute, as seemingly would be
any student of American constitutional law in its present stage
of development. However, the justices were not in accord on the
equally, if not more important, question of the use of this statu-
tory weapon of conservation defense by the administrative au-
thority. A clear and strong opinion on this question was written,
which is very impressive, and which voices the idea that the
statute was applied to an isolated situation and when there was
no "necessity" for its invocation, since there was no waste in
existence nor imminent as no new wells were planned nor could
be drilled because of war scarcity of materials. Hence, in one
justice's opinion the forcing of the complainant to pool and share
returns at this time was arbitrary and an invalid administrative
act. Complainant was held to be due reimbursement for his proper
share of well cost, however, and on this point it might also be
argued that simply because he happened to have bden first to put
his straw in the chocolate soda that he should not be permitted to
draw all from the container because the war prevented his neigh-
bor-joint owner of the underground pool-from being able to
participate.
Certain agreements and amendments thereto were the sub-
96. 202 La. 97, 11 So. (2d) 495 (1942).
97. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 4741.11-4741.31.
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ject of interpretation and construction in Niblett Farms, Incor-
porated v. Markley-Bankhedd, Incorporated 8 The original agree-
ments-geophysical and exploration contracts-granted options
to make geophysical explorations, or rework an old well, or drill,
or, if none of these things were done within three months, to pay
$3,033.12. Later, other optionees were substituted for the first
named party, the defendant. In deciding that the defendant owed
nothing, the court said: "Clearly the defendant corporation's
rights under the original contract were destroyed with the ex-
press consent of the plaintiff, and it follows necessarily that its
obligations under that contract were likewise extinguished." An
assignment was alleged but the court stated that the record did
not disclose how the third party acquired the right to renew the
contract and option to lease and hence no weight was given to
this attempt to keep the defendant in the picture.
Plaintiff had purchased $6,735.96 worth of oil from defendant
and so many lien and royalty claimants appeared for participation
in this purchase money that plaintiff deposited the price in the
registry, of the court and instituted concursus proceedings in
Southport Petroleum Company of Delaware v. Fithian29  The
controversy resolved itself into the question of "whether or not
Act 145 of 1934 gives a lien on the oil produced from the wells
and the funds derived from its sale."'' 10 Having found that no
lien was given by the 1934 act, the court went further and ex-
pressed the view that even under the amendment found in Act
100 of 1940101 "it might be seriously questioned whether it was the
intention of the Legislature to extend the lien to all the oil pro-
duced or to restrict it to the oil stored upon the leasehold.' 0 2
In Realty Operators, Incorporated v. State Mineral Board,'
the mineral board was enjoined from leasing a body of fresh
water known as Lake Hatch. After finding that the water was
located within the area granted to plaintiff by patent, the court
held that it did not matter whether the water was navigable or
not, as the state had permitted the limit of six years after passage
of Act 62 of 1912 to run and could not now attack the patent
on any ground. Assuming that the lake was navigable in 1812
there was no restraint on the state's disposition of the bed of this
98. 202 La. 982, 13 So. (2d) 287 (1943).
99. 203 La. 49, 13 So. (2d) 382 (1943).
100. 203 La. 49, 52, 13 So. (2d) 382, 383.
101. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 5101.1-5101.5.
102. 203 La. 49, 54, 13 So. (2d) 382, 384.
103. 202 La. 398, 12 So. (2d) 198 (1942).
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fresh water lake unconnected with any arm of the sea until the
adoption of the 1921 Constitution. The mineral board acting as
the state's agent was obviously under the same restrictions as was
the state.
State v. Erwin,0 4 Miami Corporation v. State,10 5 and Amerada
Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board0 6 form one of the
most interesting trilogies in our jurisprudence. State v. Erwin was
concerned with submerged lands found in the so-called Calcasieu
Lake, an expansion of Calcasieu River. The river entered and
left the expansive body of water as a river and had a channel
through the so-called lake. The court held that the body of water
in question was a true lake to which Articles 509 and 510 of the
Code dealing with accretion and dereliction of alluvion did not
apply, as these articles mentioned rivers, streams, and running
water but said nothing about lakes. Article 558 of the Code Na-
poleon dealing with lakes and ponds was discussed and the court
observed that the failure to include this article with its com-
panion articles-our 509 and 510-did not mean that the redactors
of our Code intended the rules of 509 and 510 to be applied to
lakes as the articles used the term rivers, streams, running water.
Thus the submerged area of Grand "Lake" remained the property
of private owners under a shore line boundary designation as of
1812, under the sea shore rule of Article 450, which incidentally
also mentions "running water."
The Miami Corporation case was concerned again with sub-
merged lands found in the so-called Grand Lake, an expansion
of the Mermentau River. Again the river entered and left the
expansive body of water as a river and had a channel through
the so-called lake. The Erwin case was overruled and the sub-
merged margin was held to belong to the state. The case was
grounded on the public policy of necessity for obvious reasons of
having the title to the bed of navigable water in the state. Justice
O'Niell dissented strongly on the ground of inadvisability of
changing a property rule so quickly and also on the ground that
State v. Erwin was correctly decided under the Code. Justice
Rogers, who had dissented in the Erwin case, again dissented
mainly on need for stable rules of property. The new chapter,
the Amerada case, was concerned not with submerged land but
with emerged land on the shore of the arm of the so-called Grand
104. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
105. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
106. 203 La. 473, 14 So. (2d) 61 (1943).
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Lake, an expansion of the Atchafalaya River. The river again
entered and left the "lake" as a river and had a channel -through
it. The trial judge neatly avoided both the Erwin and the Mi-
ami Corporation cases as he was dealing with emergence-not
submergence-and applied Article 509, dealing with accretion. It
was conceded that if the body of water dealt with was a lake
the article was not pertinent. After consulting the dictionaries
and examining the natural facts the so-called Grand Lake was
held not to be a lake in the legal sense but a stream as differen-
tiated from a river because of the lack of well defined banks.
The decision then is grounded on the finding that this arm of
Grand Lake was a river or a "running stream, in the nature of
a river" as stated by the chief justice in his concurring remarks,
while adhering to his dissent in the Miami Corporation case.
Under identical natural conditions, two expansions of rivers
called lakes have been put in the legal lake class while one ex-
pansion of a river called a lake has been placed in the legal river
class or "running stream in the nature of a river" class. Certainly
the decision is highly satisfactory for, if the state under public
policy or any other theory gains by submergence, private land-
owners should gain by emergence as a matter of fair play. We
now have two classes-one of seashore and legal lakes-one of
rivers and running streams in the nature of rivers. The matter
of finding out which is which may continue to be difficult. "Run-
ning water" is not decisive as that term is included in the sea-
shore article, 450, and so appears in both classes. Well defined
banks are not requisite to a river if it has the other "in the nature
of" characteristics. We have learned in previous cases that tides
and salt do not necessarily make seashore. We may have learned
that still water with no tides and no running flow is a lake. If
we find no conditions like that, we may have only river and sea
to deal with legally, which would be a relief. That the water was
not still as indicated by the dictionary's version of lake was true
in all three cases. In each situation the water was flowing or
running but "running water" is included in the seashore article,
which has been applied to lakes in previous decisions. The word
stream indicated a lesser not a greater body than a river-accord-
ing to Chief Justice O'Niell's discussion in his dissenting opinion
in the Miami Corporation case. He says "the words which, in
the Code Napoleon, are 'fleuve ou rivi~re,' are 'river or creek';
which, in article 509 of the Revised Civil Code, are changed to
'river or other stream.' That was an accurate translation, because
the French word fleuve means large river; and the French word
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rivi~re means 'stream' or a river of less magnitude than one
which would be called fleuve." The chief justice continues with
this statement: "What I have undertaken to demonstrate is that
the care and discrimination with which the redactors and trans-
lators of these articles of the Codes selected their words leaves
no doubt that they did not intend that the term 'river or other
stream,' or 'running water,' should mean or include 'lake.' "17 In
connection with this last statement it should be recalled that the
term "running water" appears in the seashore article which has
been used to include lakes by some decisions.
The supreme court in the Amerada case after approving
much of the trial judge's language states that "The trial judge
was correct in holding that the body of water known as the
arm of Grand Lake is a stream with running water. It may be
that he did not go far enough in holding that, because it did not
have well defined banks, it was not a river,. although with this
exception, it possesses all the characteristics of a river. In his
holding, the trial judge overlooked the admission of the state, as
contained in paragraph 6 of the agreed statement of facts, that
the stream in question flowed between banks and its width be-
tween the banks at two separate and distinct points are given.
"The arm of Grand Lake is not and has never been stagnant,
but has always consisted of running water. It is unmistakably a
part of the Atchafalaya River by which its waters are solely
supplied. It is not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and
through it the waters of the Atchafalaya River run to again
form a distinct river at the Town of Patterson before reaching the
gulf."
The matter of emergence and submergence, as caused by geo-
logical transitions and so urgently pleaded in the Miami Corpora-
tion case would seem to leave the issue of accretion and dere-
liction still to be answered, as the areas affected by these major
disturbances seem usually to be much larger than just the por-
tions covered by water and all to be rising or sinking at the same
relative level so the shore lines could not be isolated for treat-
ment in a submerged case at least and were not so isolated for
determination in the Miami Corporation case even though the
rate of erosionary action is said to be increased by the submerg-
ing process.
In Deas v. Lane,08 the plaintiff was successful in having the
107. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 833, 173 So. 315, 331 (1936).
108. 202 La. 933, 13 So. (2d) 270 (1943).
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defendant's one-quarter mineral interest declared extinguished
by prescription of ten years non-user. The theory of defendant's
pleas was new and interesting. Plaintiff sold land and reserved
minerals and by acknowledgment these reservations took new
life on August 16, 1920. Later plaintiff sold parts of his holdings
to various persons, including defendant's donor, who bought in
1925. On September 5, 1930, plaintiff re-acquired the land and in
1933, in order to avoid a law suit and for other considerations, he
confirmed title to certain fractional mineral holdings in several
of the original purchasers. Defendant claimed that when plain-
tiff sold in 1925 the one-quarter interest in question, he warranted
right to use it for ten years. The court cited Articles 2475, 2477,
2481, 2646, 2501, 2500, 2502, and declared that plaintiff had sold
an incorporeal right, had not created a new servitude, had sold
a right in existence at the time, and that no previous encum-
brances or claims of third parties had defeated defendant's right
but only his own failure to use it. The court said: "We know
of no law, and we have not been referred to any, that obligates
the seller of an incorporeal right to warrant that the right will
not become lost subsequently by prescription. In fact, the vendor
is not even precluded by his warranty from seeking to re-acquire
by prescription the property he has sold."
The next plea of interest was that when the plaintiff, after
re-acquiring the land, confirmed the holdings previously out-
standing that he re-created for all previous holders as the servi-
tude, being indivisible, could not be revived in part. The court
stated that these contracts having been made after prescription
had accrued were in reality conveyances of new rights to the
parties to the contracts of whom defendant was of course not
one. Suspension by minority was pleaded next but, since the
father of the minor died after prescription had accrued, there
was no merit in that attempt. The last defense-suspension
because of obstacle to use-was tied in with the warranty idea
discussed above so was also unsuccessful.
An interesting case grounded on Fite v. Miller'01 appears
under title of Fogle v. Feazel1"0 wherein suit was filed for dam-
ages-the amount which a well would have cost-for failure to
drill a well on land not belonging to plaintiff, being part consid-
eration for lease of plaintiff's land. The suit failed. It was dif-
109 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939).
110. 201 La. 899, 10 So. (2d) 695 (1942).
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ferentiated by the court from Fite v. Miller on the ground that
since plaintiff did not own the land, he could not have suffered a
damage, even a loss of the prospect of enrichment. The court
found further that the contract showed that the intention of the
parties never contemplated any penalty for this breach other
than nullification of the lease. There was no proof apparent
leading to the idea that the stipulation had been made for another
or that failure to answer the question of whether there was oil
or not in the land of another had been detrimental to plaintiff in
his own dealings or that such information was worth a real price
to him for any reason. That being the case the well settled
Louisiana rule on damages seems to have been followed. The
fact per se that the land of another was to be drilled as considera-
tion rather than land of the plaintiff might not have appeared,
alone, to be a satisfactory mark of distinction from the Fite v.
Miller doctrine, but under the evidence which disclosed no dam-
age, the decision seems in line with the established rule.
The issues of the case of Reed v. Feazelt 1" were identical with
those of Fogle v. Feazel and were disposed of in like manner and
without opinion.
The case of Haas v. Cerami,1 1 2 characterized by the court as a
"sequel of Cerami v. Haas,I' s approved the holding in that case
to the effect that the recordation of a letter, the offer, amounted
to acceptance and that the letter and action formed a valid con-
tract. The question was raised by the plea of res adjudicata. The
court again refused to annul a sale of mineral rights on the
ground of lesion as the value in unproven land is essentially spec-
ulative.
Plaintiff lost his suit for damages under a lease contract pro-
viding that oil wells should not be drilled within a certain num-
ber of feet of a residence in the case of Morgan v. Echols14 be-
cause it was proved that plaintiff had given his consent to the
location. Other alleged promises of defendant in regard to spot
of location of tanks, etc., were shown to have been only condi-
tional and facts of impracticability of adherence were in favor of
defendant. Plaintiff did recover $1,009 for damages to his shrubs
and trees under the specific terms-unmodified-of the lease. The
amount was fixed by the testimony of an "expert horticulturist."
111. 201 La. 912, 10 So. (2d) 699 (1942).
112. 201 La. 612, 10 So. (2d) 61 (1942).
113. 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940).
114. 201 La. 975, 10 So. (2d) 776 (1942).
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Jackson v. Gulf Refining Company 15 is a mathematical anal-
ysis, no cases being cited except the two-Succession of Tyson 1
6
and Jack v. United Gas Public Service'7-which furnished the
factual situation out of which the present controversy arose.
Plaintiff's claim for a one-twentieth interest in the land, includ-
ing mineral rights, having been defended in the supreme court
in a prior suit, is now brought against the defendants in that
suit who failed to appeal from the adverse decision of the lower
court, finally decided in favor of those defendants who did ap-
peal. The court decided that the adverse final judgment against
the plaintiff in the previous suit settled the matter and that the
defendant in this case had no interest in appealing the previous
case since the judgment was against their transferors, who would
be held and the five per cent involved, had it been affirmed, was
not enough to encroach upon the nine per cent interest of the
present defendants since their transferors would still be left
with plenty to satisfy the judgment without encroachment upon
the holding of the present defendants. The present defendants
had a right to the benefit of the reversal of judgment on appeal
in any case as the first judgment was not an independent judg-
ment against them.
The facts in International Paper Company v. Louisiana Cen-
tral Lumber Company"18 were that defendant had sold min-
eral rights in 200,000 acres to the Louisiana Central Oil and Gas
Company on May 25, 1926; that defendant had sold 10,000 acres
of land to the Bastrop Pulp and Paper Company on May 25,
1926, but had reserved mineral rights; that the Bastrop Pulp and
Paper Company had sold the land to plaintiff on December 9,
1927. The court decided that a landowner whose deed excludes
mineral rights may not bring a jactitation suit against a party
owning mineral rights under a recorded title and exercising those
rights. "To order the defendant in this case to assert its claim
to the mineral rights by way of a petitory action, or an action in
revindication within a time to be fixed in the judgment, would
compel the defendant to surrender its possession and to stop
exercising the mineral rights, and to surrender to the plaintiff
all of its producing oil wells-to the number exceeding 100 wells
-which the defendant's lessees have drilled at an enormous
cost."111
9
115. 201 La. 721, 10 So. (2d) 593 (1942).
116. 186 La. 516, 172 So. 772 (1937).
117. 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940).
118. 202 La. 621, 12 So. (2d) 659 (1943).
119. 202 La. 621, 634, 12 So. (2d) 659, 663.
1944]1
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The case of Goree v. Sanders12 0 follows the doctrine of Sam-
ple v. Whitaker121 in placing title of mineral rights in the good
faith holder of land possessing for ten years-allowing no sus-
pension of prescription in favor of a minor who inherited mineral
rights after prescription had begun to run against his parent.
The doctrine that if possession begins in good faith, it will not be
adversely affected by subsequent knowledge was again followed
as was the doctrine that recordation of an outstanding right will
play no part in the "good faith" if the holder does not examine
the record. Admission that there was an outstanding right was
not acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription as there
was no intent to do so. Acceptance of benefits did not estop the
acceptor from denying that there was express acknowledgment
with intent to interrupt. All of these principles are familiar.
The most interesting point was the matter of whether the posses-
sion of the land with its mineral rights intact had been continuous
and undisturbed. The facts were that the plaintiff who had
bought the land in the belief that no mineral rights were out-
standing later learned of the existence of the servitude which
was used and plaintiff participated in the benefits of production.
Clearly his possession was disturbed during this period and
prescription interrupted-both liberandi and acquirendi. How-
ever, the lease was finally abandoned and ten years had elapsed
since abandonment. Certainly the second period was entered
upon in bad faith, but the original purchase in good faith carried
through for the acquirer as against those pleadings no liberation
by virtue of suspension for a minor holder-despite the period of
interruption of possession and the acceptance of benefits during
production season.
Lum Chow v. Board of Commissioners for Lafourche Basin
Levee District'2' reiterates the well established principle that
"where one sells the property of another and later acquires title
to the property, the title thus acquired inures to the benefit of his
vendee." The same thing is true if an imperfect title is trans-
ferred which later is made whole.
The case of McDonald v. Richard2 3 is perhaps the most in-
teresting of the group of the period assembled here. The facts
were that on June 25, 1929, the Morely Cypress Company sold to
Dr. J. A. Richard an undivided half interest in 640 acres of land
120. 203 La. 859, 14 So. (2d) 744 .(1943).
121. 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930).
122. 203 La. 268, 13 So. (2d) 857 (1943).
123. 203 La. 155, 13 So. (2d) 712 (1943).
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and reserved all of the mineral rights in the land. During the
life of the Morely Cypress Company's servitude Dr. Richard
made three separate sales of mineral rights. Later, but within
the ten year period, Dr. Richard sold his undivided interest in
the land and plaintiff herein finally acquired a one-quarter un-
divided interest in the land and had title when the Morely Cy-
press Company's mineral servitude expired for non-user. Plain-
tiff's suit is to assert ownership in one-quarter of the minerals as
against Dr. Richard's mineral rights vendees. He was success-
ful in his claim as the court maintained that Dr. Richard had
simply sold something that he did not own, which was the situa-
tion apparently under the doctrine of White v. Hodges.2 4 The
opinion by Chief Justice O'Niell discusses the reversionary in-
terest cases at length and makes very clear the proposition that
the public policy and law of servitude is not to be evaded by the
sale of a "series of mineral rights," with the stipulation or under-
standing that each servitude thus imposed upon the land would
take effect only when andif the previously imposed servitude or
servitudes should become extinguished by the liberative pre-
scription of ten years.' 1 5 While this case is not decided on the
issue of a reversionary interest, as it was not so considered, the
opinion nevertheless uses such strong language in the discussion
that it can hardly be doubtful that if and when a reversionary
interest is sold or reserved that prescription will begin to run on
the date of sale and not upon the date of reversion. Gailey v. Mc-
Farlain126 was again honored wherein it was indicated that such
an interest does exist and may be sold though it was not con-
veyed by the seller in that case. Apparently then the court con-
tinues to recognize the theory of reversionary interest and the
interest as a valuable right which may be dealt with, but judging
from all the cases it had best be labelled or may fall into another
category as of a thing sold while not owned. Suppose Dr. Rich-
ard had labelled the subject matter of his sale reversionary in-
terest in minerals rather than mineral rights, which he did not
have in 1936 but expected to have in 1939. Presumably this min-
eral interest would then have vested in these vendees in 1939 and
their right to use them would have continued until 1946 regard-
less of who owned the land unless the theory of reversionary
interests is to be cast out entirely in favor of the principles ap-
plying to sale of a thing not owned.
124. 201 La. 1, 9 So. (2d) 433 (1942).
125. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 164, 13 So. (2d) 712, 715 (1943).
126. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
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Sabatier v. Canal Oil Company, Incorporated, 127 is a suit to
cancel a mineral lease. Failure to properly develop the property
and failure of adequate consideration because of small produc-
tion were alleged. In the alternative it was pleaded that the
lease was void because of a potestative condition and authori-
zation for perpetual holding. The facts were that the lessee had
drilled nine wells in six years, including offset wells to prevent
drainage from an adjoining field and those findings disposed of
the primary pleas under well established jurisprudence as well
as practical business. The jurisprudence is also well established
that whether the condition was potestative or not-and the court
did not here decide-the execution of the terms of the contract
cure the original defect. The fact that the lease in question had
no specific primary term was cared for by the definite require-
ments for drilling successive wells within stated periods on pen-
alty of forfeiture. The trial judge had set a primary term which
was properly declared error. The parallel of timber cases was
not exact, because of the impossibility of estimating underground
oil stores or setting a reasonable time for their removal.
Gennuso v. Magnolia Petroleum Company'2 8 recites another
attempted cancellation of an oil lease for failure to develop the
property with "reasonable diligence." The facts disclosed that
the maximum production allowed by the order of the Louisiana
Conservation Commission had been taken consistently and that
the producer had expended over seventy thousand dollars on
the lease, which had yielded nearly $86,000 worth of oil of which
over $10,000 worth had been received by the rent royalty own-
ers. Furthermore, on authority of a well-trained geologist, the
drilling of more shallow wells'or of deep wells would have been
bad judgment in the face of the scientific information at hand.
The court's decision was obviously against cancellation.
II. TORTS
Venue of suits for trespass against realty, in contrast to the
concept of actions in tort as "transitory actions," is an interesting
high- light of recent tort decisions by our supreme court.
We note for discussion several slander of title cases which
apparently may be held to be suits in jactitation of title without
necessarily being petitory actions.
127. 202 La. 639, 12 So. (2d) 665 (1942).
128. 203 La. 559, 14 So. (2d) 445 (1943).
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Abatement of nuisances is involved in the interpretation in
one case of a traffic ordinance and in another case of the proce-
dure for obtaining temporary restraining orders from the court.
Among automobile damage suits, the supreme couit has
broadened the basis of recovery by decreeing a limitation on the
doctrine of contributory negligence, but it has also affirmed that
negligence is never presumed merely from the happening of an
accident.
Of interest to laymen, and to newspaper publishers, in par-
ticular, are two cases setting up a severe limitation of the doc-
trine of qualified privilege, respecting fair comment and criticism
of public officials and men in public life. Our court will not only
require that statements disclose true facts, but the burden of
proving their truth is on the defendant.
Actions by the state against a former sheriff and his surety
for alleged shortages in the sheriff's salary fund are not barred by
two year prescription in favor of the sheriff.
Venue of Action for Trespass Against Realty
The suit of a drainage district against the city of New Or-
leans alleging a trespass by the municipality upon the district's
realty and real servitudes, though the alleged acts were ultra
vires, was properly brought in the district court of the parish
where the property was situated.1  The municipality's con-
tention that this was a suit to recover compensation for appro-
priation of realty and real servitudes and that it should be
brought in the parish where the municipality was located and
domiciled was overruled by the court. The court cited with ap-
proval the case of Brown v. Louisiana & Northwest Railroad Com-
pany,2 from which case the court quoted: "in all matters relating
to real servitude, the judge of the place where the property is
situated has cognizance of the case. Code of Practice, Art. 165,
Par. 8."
Tort-A Transitory Action
A married woman domiciled in Texas who was injured in an
automobile accident in Louisiana can maintain an action for
damages in Louisiana in her own right, notwithstanding that in
1. Fourth Jefferson Drainage Dist. v. New Orleans, 203 La. 670, 14 So.
(2d) 482 (1943).
2. 118 La. 87, 42 So. 656 (1906).
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Texas her right of action was community property and recover-
able only by her husband.8
In tort cases, our supreme court has resolved the conflict of
laws question by holding that the law of the place where the
wrong was committed is paramount. The law of the domicil will
be recognized only in exceptional circumstances for reaso ns of
comity and where the law of the domicil is not inimical to public
policy of the forum.
Articles 2334 and 2402 of the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana,
giving a married woman right to claim damages for her personal
injuries as her separate property and "in her own name, are not
exclusively for the benefit of women domiciled in Louisiana.
Slander of Title
In the first reported case the defendants continued prospect-
ing for oil and gas on the land involved at intervals of six months
or less from 1929 until large production was obtained in 1940.
Plaintiff had had undisputed possession of the timber and surface
rights during the same period but had made no attempt to take
possession of, or to exercise control over, the right to prospect for
oil, gas, or other minerals. The court held that suit in jactitation
is not necessarily a petitory action but rather an action to estab-
lish right of possession instead of an absolute title. Therefore, as
the plaintiff had elected to limit its suit to a jactitation suit and
declined to put at issue the title to mineral rights in the land, the
judgment of dismissal was affirmed.4
In another case the defendants, acting in legal bad faith in
cutting and removing timber from plaintiff's property, were held
liable in damages for the full manufactured value of the timber,
less the cost of manufacture only.'
Tax sales in face of continued possession by a tax debtor for
forty-five years after tax sale are invalid. Therefore, an action of
jactitation of title in the name of the tax debtor still in posses-
sion was successfully maintained against defendant's claim of
tax title.'
3. Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So. (2d) 253 (1942).
4. International Paper Co. v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 202 La. 621,
12 So. (2d) 659 (1943).
5. Brunning v. R. W. Hillcoat Co., Lester v. Same, 203 La. 279, 13 So.
(2d) 861 (1943), citing St. Paul v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., Ltd., 116
La. 585, 40 So. 906 (1906); State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., Ltd., 131 La.
62, 58 So. 1033 (1912); Hickman v. Hill, Harris & Co., 168 La. 881, 123 So. 606
(1929).
6. Schwing Lumber and Shingle Co., Inc. v. Board of Com'rs for Atchafa-
laya Basin Levee Dist., 202 La. 477, 12 So. (2d) 235 (1943), citing South Lou-
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It is interesting that the court points out again, as it did in
a former case, that "'no matter in whose name the property has
been assessed, the owner of record at the time of the advertise-
ment and sale for taxes is to be regarded as the delinquent tax
debtor within the meaning of the constitutional provision requir-
ing notice to be given to the delinquent before making the sale,
and where notice of delinquency was not given to the record
owner, the tax sale is void.' "7
In one other case,8 the supreme court has reiterated that a
suit purporting to be for libel and slander of plaintiff's title to
real estate may be a suit in jactitation to protect possession rath-
er than a strict possessory action.
Abatement of Nuisances
A trial court in the city of New Orleans had granted a pre-
liminary injunction in a suit by adjacent property owners, pro-
hibiting the operation of a restaurant with parking space provid-
ed on adjoining vacant lots. The right to injunctive relief was
based upon the terms of a municipal ordinance which forbids the
opening or maintaining of a driveway across a sidewalk within
one hundred fifty feet of the nearest property line of the intersec-
tion of any two avenues having double roadways and neutral
grounds and being protected by a traffic light or traffic officer,
where such driveways serve establishments dispensing liquid
or solid refreshments to customers in drive-in vehicles for such
purpose.9 The supreme court ordered the preliminary injunction
dissolved and'the suit dismissed, holding that the plaintiff (the
neighboring property owner) had no cause of action under the
cited ordinance for the reason that the ordinance governing such
driveways was a traffic ordinance and not a zoning ordinance.
The court called attention to the wording in the title and in the
text of the ordinance in which its purpose is declared to be to re-
lieve traffic congestion, to reduce the number of traffic accidents,
and to promote the public welfare. The court also found from the
Isiana Land Co. v. Norgress, 120 La. 168, 45 So. 49 (1907); Millver v. Albert
Hanson Lumber Co., 130 La. 662, 58 So. 502 (1912); Dupuy v. Joly, 197 La.
19, 200 So. 806 (1941); Kees v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 183 La. 111, 162
So. 817 (1935); Baldwin v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 185 La. 1051,
171 So. 442 (1936).
7. Martin v. Serice, 200 La. 556, 560, 8 So. (2d) 538, 539 (1942).
8. Realty Operators, Inc. v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. (2d)
198 (1942).
9. State ex rel. Szodomka v. Gruber, 201 La. 1068, 10 So. (2d) 899 (1942).
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record that the defendant's business as conducted was not of itself
a public nuisance.10
The court further discouraged suits to regulate the use of
private property by dismissing the suit of certain citizens to abate
a gambling nuisance.1 In this case the plaintiff was unsuccessful
in obtaining a temporary restraining order from the trial court
and his petition for writs was denied because of his failure to file
his suit formally in the clerk's office before presenting it to the
judge for his action as required by statute.12
Contributory Negligence-Error in Extremis
The defense of defendant truck driver and of his insurer was
the contributory negligence of the driver of the plaintiff's Grey-
hound passenger bus. It had been conceded that, in the emerg-
ency caused by the defendant suddenly cutting out of his traffic.
lane head-on in front of the plaintiff's driver, the plaintiff bus
driver had suddenly driven abruptly off the paved right-of-way
to the far side of the wide unpaved embankment. The resulting
collision would have been averted, according to the defendant's
theory, if the bus driver had merely applied his brakes and re-
mained on the pavement in his own line of traffic.
The court denied the plea and concluded that a motorist who,
by the negligence of another, is suddenly placed in an emergency
and compelled to act instantly to avoid injury, is not guilty of
negligence if he makes such choice as a person of ordinary pru-
dence placed in the same position might make. This is true even
though he does not make the wisest choice and one that would
be required in exercise of ordinary care but for the emergency. 13
The court also sustained the general rule that a driver has the
right to presume that drivers of vehicles approaching from the
opposite direction will obey the law of the road and will remain
on their proper side of the highway.
10. The court. distinguished the Szodomka case above from the cases of
City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798, 40 A.L.R. 1136
(1924) and State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So.
613 (1929). The doctrine of those decisions is not applicable to a traffic ordi-
nance, enacted only for the protection of the public generally, and not for
the special benefit of the property owners or residents in a defined area.
11. Christina v. O'Dwyer, 203 La. 103, 13 So. (2d) 481 (1943).
12. The custom of presenting petition for temporary injunction to the
judge prior to filing petition could not prevail over positive law requiring
such petition to be filed before being acted on by the court. La. Act 192 of
1920, § 5 (1), (10) as amended by La. Act 120 of 1940 [Dart's Crim. Stats.
(1943) §§ 1026, 10331.:
13. La. Act 21 of 1932, § 3, rule 7(c).
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Res Ipsa Loquitur
In the case of a fatal fall from a moving ambulance, the court
held that, where the happening of an accident with its attendant
circumstances may justify the inference of negligence, it is fun-
damental that negligence is never presumed from the happening
of an accident. 4 The accident must be one which ordinarily could
not happen except through defects in the car, or fault in opera-
tion, or both.
The instant case was predicated on the theory that the door
of the ambulance in which plaintiff was riding, or its lock, was
defective and that the door swung open because of such defects
or because of negligent operation of the car. The court found that
the accident happened at a place where the road was smooth and
straight and while the ambulance was being driven at a speed
that was not excessive. There was nothing wrong with the door
of the ambulance or its lock and the ambulance was not driven
in such a way as to cause the door to swing open. The door could
not open except by some person turning its handle. The factual
situation set forth in this case was such as to render the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable.
It is the duty of the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively,
and it is only where the circumstances leave no room for a dif-
ferent presumption that the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies.
When it is shown that the accident might have happened as the
result of one of two causes, the reason for the rule fails and it
cannot be invoked. 15
Privilege of Publication of Defamatory Matter
Two cases decided by the court during the past term are per-
haps the most important in recent years on the subject of quali-
fied privilege enjoyed by the press respecting comment on and
criticism of public officers and men in public life.
In one case, suit was brought by a member of a levee board
against the Plaquemines Gazette for damages resulting from the
publication of a newspaper article containing statements of fact
which were alleged by the plaintiff to be false. It was held that
the trial court erred in maintaining the defendant's objection of
no right or cause of action.
14. Morales v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 202 La. 755, 12 So.(2d)
804 (1943).
15. Citing Quass v. Milwaukee Gaslight Co., 168 Wis. 575, 170 N.W. 942
(1919); Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736, 5 A.L.R. 1237 (1919).
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Judge McCaleb, speaking for the court, says:
"It is clear to us that the article complained of by the
plaintiff defames his character for it declares, in no uncertain
language, that he was derelict in his duty by deserting his
post in an hour of peril. Charges that a public officer neglected
to perform duties incumbent upon him are actionable and, if
they are false, malice will be presumed....
"While it is firmly established that the conduct of persons
in public life is open to fair criticism and comment, this priv-
ilege does not extend to charges of misconduct or neglect of
duty which are alleged to be false. In 110 A.L.R. 412, the ma-
jority rule respecting false criticism of the acts of public of-
ficers is stated thus:
"'In the majority of jurisdictions the rule that fair com-
ment on and criticism of the acts and conduct of a public of-
ficer or candidate for public office are, in the absence of malice,
privileged, does not apply to a false statement of fact. In these
jurisdictions, a defamatory statement of fact concerning one
in public life, or who is a candidate for office, if false, is as ac-
tionable as would be such a statement concerning one in pri-
vate life.'
"Louisiana is one of the States which adhere to the
majority rule."'16
In the second case, 7 the court also found that the privilege
does not extend to the publication of false statements of fact con-
cerning public officers. The right accorded extends only to fair
comment and not to falsity in the assertion of facts.
In The Law of Journalism, by R. W. Jones, it is stated:
"Anything of public interest and importance may be
fairly commented on and fairly criticized. The comment and
16. Cadro v. Plaquemines Gazette, Inc., 202 La. 1, 6, 11 So.(2d) 10, 11
(1942). See Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La. 594, 49 So. 206, 23 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 726, 131 Am. St. Rep. 356 (1909); Smith v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 77 So.
896, L.R.A. 1918E (1917); Otero v. Ewing, 162 La. 453, 110 So. 648, 56 A.L.R.
249 (1926); Otero v. Ewing, 165 La. 398, 115 So. 633 (1927).
17. Martin v. Markley, 202 La. 291, 11 So.(2d) 593 (1942). In the words of
the court, "the comment made by the defendant, that the acts of the plain-
tiffs in connection with the killing of Nace Harris are 'a blot on law and
justice', is fully justified provided that the facts upon which the conclusion
is founded are true. But since the facts stated in defendant's letter, that, as
an eye witness to the tragedy, she saw the fatal shot fired while Nace Harris
was in a helpless state and had assumed an attitude of surrender, are defa-
matory per se, the burden rested upon her to prove to the satisfaction of the
court the truth of these facts in order for her to claim the asserted privilege
of fair comment." (202 La. at 303, 11 So.(2d) at 597.)
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criticism may be adverse, but must be fair. In order to be
fair the facts involved must warrant the comment or criti-
cism made, and so truth is involved in the defense.""
While the court held that it would be justified in affirming
the judgment of the trial court in plaintiff's favor, it actually re-
manded the case to give the defendent opportunity to show the
truth of the statements contained in her letter in view of the fact
that defense counsel had sincerely, though erroneously, believed
that the burden vas upon the plaintiff to show the falsity of state-
ments of fact in the letter.19 It is interesting to notice that Chief
Justice O'Niell dissented, being of the opinion that defendant's
plea of vagueness was well founded and that she was entitled to
know what part of her narrative was claimed to be untrue by
plaintiff.
Action Against Sheriff
It may not be surprising, but it is interesting to find that the
state of Louisiana is without authority to institute suit on a cause
of action belonging to a political subdivision that possesses the
right to sue for its own account.
However, allegations of liability in a suit20 in the name of a
state against a former sheriff and his surety for alleged shortages
or mishandling of funds in the sheriff's salary fund will be main-
tained to the extent of the state's interest, such interest being
fixed by statute. It was not necessary to state this interest with
particularity since the statute fixing this interest will be read
into the petition.21 The two-year prescription in favor of a sheriff
was held to be no bar to such a suit which alleged "malfeasance."
Such a suit could not be brought by the state through its
Crime Commission because the statute creating that agency is un-
constitutional. It is held that the statute authorizing suit in behalf
18. Jones, The Law of Journalism (1940) 99.
19. In 36 C.J., Verbo Libel & Slander (1924) 1283, § 289, in discussing the
question of false statements of fact with reference to privileged communica-
tions it is declared: "But there is a distinction between an ordinary privi-
leged communication and the so-called privilege of fair comment or criticism.
What the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom
of discussion rather than of statement. What is privileged, if that is the
proper term, is the criticism of comment, not the statement of facts on which
it is based. Generally speaking, comment or criticism must be founded on
truth. While ordinarily it does not consist of the assertion of facts, an alle-
gation of fact may be justified by its being an inference from other facts
truly stated. The right to comment or criticize does not extend to, or justify,
allegations of fact of defamatory character."
20. State ex rel. Jones v. Doucet, 203 La. 743, 14 So.(2d) 622 (1943).
21. La. Act 156 of 1920, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7509].
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of the state by the attorney general, or district attorney, in the
name of the governor, authorizes action in the name of the state
on relation of the governor.
22
III. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. CRIMINAL LAW
One of the primary purposes of the 1942 Louisiana Criminal
Code' was to simplify the criminal law by eliminating many of
those technical distinctions which Louisiana had inherited from
the common law.2 A number of the 1942-1943 supreme court
decisions, dealing with crimes committed before the enactment
of the new Criminal Code, illustrate the need for such simplifica-
tion. In summarizing those decisions, the writer will indicate
how the particular case would fit into our new law of crimes,
and also how far the opinions are indicative of future judicial
interpretation of pertinent articles of the 1942 Criminal Code.
Theft-Embezzlement, Larceny, or Obtaining by False Pretenses?
In State v. Doucet' and State v. Savoy 4 the defendants,
sheriff and parish assessor, respectively, were charged with the
embezzlement of money from their salary funds. These funds
had been deposited with the parish treasurer, subject to expendi-
ture upon orders from defendants. Defense counsel demurred to
the indictments, urging that the salary funds in question were
not entrusted to the possession of the defendants and that the
misappropriation could not, therefore, constitute the crime of
embezzlement as charged. The district court and three of the
supreme court justices subscribed to this view. Mr. Justice
Higgins, one of the three dissenters, indicated that the charge
should have been either larceny or obtaining property by false
pretenses.5 The majority opinion, upholding the sufficiency of
the indictments, was predicated on the view that the defendants
22. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3539 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7466].
1. La. Act 43 of 1942 [Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) §§ 740.1
-740.144].
2. Section 33 of the Louisiana Crimes Act of 1805 specifically adopted
common law definitions for the crimes denounced therein. Subsequently,
additional statutory crimes were superimposed in hit-or-miss fashion, and
this did not tend to clarify the picture.
3. 204 La. 79, 14 So. (2d) 917 (1943).
4. 204 La. 99, 14 So. (2d) 924 (1943).
5. State v. Doucet, 204 La. 79, 14 So. (2d) 917, 920 (1943).
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should be considered as being in legal possession of the money in
their respective salary funds. Thus, the misappropriation would
constitute embezzlement.
The 1942 Criminal Code eliminates the necessity of such
hair-line decisions by merging these formerly separate, though
substantially identical, offenses in the single crime of theft.6
This crime covers any case where an offender takes, misappro-
priates, or obtains by false pretenses-the common element
being the fact that he has deprived the lawful owner of his
property.
Theft-Embezzlement of Public Funds
The two cases of State v. Manouvrier7 furnish another illus-
tration of the technical difficulties inherent in the former embez-
zlement laws. Mairouvrier, St. Landry Parish Treasurer, had
been indicted for public embezzlement." He had misappropriated
part of a sum of money withdrawn from the general parish
account for use in paying convention expenses of members of
the policy jury. The first ground urged in support of a motion
to quash the indictment was that it failed to show how much
of the money alleged to have been embezzled came from state
taxing bodies and how much came from parish funds. Defense
counsel alleged that embezzlement of state funds and embezzle-
ment of parish and local funds were separate and distinct
offenses, since the latter had been specially designated under a
separate section of the revised statutes. The supreme court
overruled this contention, taking the view that the special pro-
vision in the Revised Statutes 6f 1870 concerning the embezzle-
ment of parish funds did not create a separate offense, but
merely enlarged the crime of public embezzlement so as to
include misappropriations by parish and municipal officials.
An even more difficult question was raised by defense coun-
sel's second argument that the offense charged was not public
embezzlement since the money misappropriated had become
the private property of the police jurors as a donation for conven-
tion expenses. If this were true the crime would be embezzle-
ment of private funds9 rather than public embezzlement as
6. La. Crim. Code, Art. 67.
7. 203 La. 541, 14 So. (2d) 439 (1943); and 203 La. 556, 14 So. (2d)
444 (1943).
8. The indictment was brought under Section 903 (embezzlement of public
money) and Section 904 (embezzlement of parish or city funds) of the La.
Rev. Stats. of 1870 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 912-913].
9. La. Act 165 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 914].
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charged. The supreme court took the view that this defense did
not go to the sufficiency of the indictment, but presented a
question of fact which should be decided at the trial of the case.
On the face of the indictment, the funds were public money at
the time of the misappropriation.
The crime of theft, as defined in Article 67 of the 1942 Louisi-
ana Criminal Code, comprehends all misappropriations, whether
by public officials or by private fiduciaries. 10 Thus the much
litigated distinction between "public" and "private" embezzle-
ment" is eliminated.
Theft-Necessity of Asportation
It is a generally accepted requirement of the common law
crime of larceny that there must be some asportation or carrying
away of the object stolen. The requirement has always been
very liberally applied. Thus, the mere upending of a bale of
linen with intent to steal the same 2 and pulling a package from
the front to the rear of a wagon with intent to steal it 13 have
been deemed sufficient to meet the asportation requirement.
There has been considerable conflict as to whether the asporta-
tion must be by the thief himself or may be accomplished
through the act of an innocent third party. This question had
never been decided in Louisiana until the recent case of State v.
Laborde.14 In that case defendant was charged with larceny of
a heifer. He had twice sold the heifer which belonged to another
and was grazing on a free range. The second purchaser, in good
faith, and unaccompanied by the defendant, carried the heifer
away. The Louisiana court held that the defendant could not be
found guilty of cattle stealing" because there had been no aspor-
tation of the heifer by him. The instant decision is a fine practical
illustration of the unsoundness of the view adopted. The mere
fact that the purchaser, rather than the defendant, hauled the
heifer away should not preclude defendant's criminal liability.
10. The term "anything of value," used in describing the offense, is
defined in La. Crim. Code, Art. 2, to include, "any conceivable thing of the
slightest value . .. public or private."
11. See State v. Palmer, 32 La. Ann. 565 (1880); State v. O'Kean, 35 La.
Ann. 901, 903 (1883); State v. Smith, 47 La. Ann. 432, 435, 16 So. 938, 940
(1895); State v. Stringer, 162 La. 925, 928, 111 So. 330, 331 (1927).
12. Cherry's case, 1 Leach C.L. (4 ed.) 236 note (1781).
13. Rex v. Coslet, 1 Leach C.C. 236 (1782).
14. 202 La. 59, 11 So. (2d) 404 (1942), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 323, 324: See footnotes 14-19 for other cases involving asportation by
means of an innocent agent.
15. La. Act 64 of 1910 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 10571.
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His action in selling the heifer was clearly unlawful, and the
owner was deprived of his animal just as effectively as if
defendant had himself seized it on the range and made delivery
to the innocent purchaser.
Mr. Justice Higgins' opinion emphasized the fact that com-
mon law larceny requires both a taking and an asportation of
the stolen property, and distinguished a Texas statute 6 where
the words "carry away" were not included in the definition of
theft. Giving full effect to the probable implications of this dis-
tinction, it is suggested that the offender would have been guilty
of "Theft" if his crime had been committed subsequent to the
enactment of the 1942 Criminal Code. The theft article 17 merely
requires "the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another." (Italics supplied.) While elimination
of the asportation element was not specifically intended by the
draftsmen of the theft article,18 it is a logical construction of the
phraseology employed, and achieves a very desirable result.
Theft-Penalty
The defendant in State v. Gable 9 had been convicted of
stealing property of the value of thirty-five dollars. The offense
was committed in November, 1941, but had not been tried until
after the effective date of the 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code. The
court properly held that the old larceny statute was applicable2 0
and, that since it provided for imprisonment "with or without
hard labor," the offense had been properly tried by a jury of five.
The opinion stated by way of dictum that, even assuming the
applicability of Article 67 of the Louisiana Criminal Code, the
offense was still a felony triable by a five man jury. The defend-
ant had argued that since Article 67 provided that theft in the
amount of between twenty and one hundred dollars was punish-
able either by a fine, or by imprisonment with or without hard
labor, or both, that the offense had been reduced to a misde-
meanor and should be tried by a judge. Mr. Justice Hamiter
pointed out that the test of a felony, as set out in Article 2 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code, is whether the offender may be sen-
16. Art. 77, Texas Penal Code of 1895, interpreted in Hartman v. State,
85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 582, 213 S.W. 936 (1919).
17. La. Crim. Code, Art. 67.
18. See Comment to Art. 67 of La. Crim. Code, p. 72 [Dart's Code of Crim.
Law and Proc. (1943) Arts. 740-767, at 512].
19. 202 La. 770, 12 So.(2d) 809 (1943).
20. La. Act 107 of 1902, § 5 (repealed upon the enactment of the 1942
Criminal Code).
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tenced to imprisonment at hard labor. The possible punishment
by a fine did not preclude the sentence of imprisonment at hard
labor, but was merely an alternative method of punishment.
Contributing to Delinquency of Minors
In State v. Scallan,21 a parent had been convicted of contrib-
uting to the delinquency of his thirteen year old daughter by
allowing her to go to a night club where drinking, fighting and
debauchery were common. He appealed, urging that the child
had not been adjudged delinquent, nor was there any substantial
proof of actual delinqency. In sustaining the conviction, the
supreme court emphasized the language of the statute which
defined the crime so as to include any parent who should permit
his minor child "to enter any place'where the morals of such
child may be corrupted, endangered or depraved, or may likely
be impaired. '22 Actual corruption or impairment of the child's
morals, so as to cause him (or her) to become delinquent, was
not an essential element of the offense. It may be anticipated
that this same logical construction will be applied to Article 92
of the Louisiana Criminal Code. The offender in the principal
case would be found guilty of contributing to the delinquency
of juveniles under clauses (2) and (3) of that article.23
Public Bribery
State v. Sheffield 24 presented a question as to the interpre-
tation of the word "officer" in the public bribery statute.25 It was
argued that a policeman of the city of Shreveport was not a
municipal officer, but was merely an employee of the city. In
holding that a policeman was "an officer," and within the intend-
ment of 'the public bribery statute, the supreme court relied upon
the specific language of the legislative act which gave the city
council the power to appoint the police force with "as many
21. 201 La. 1026, 10 So. (2d) 885 (1942), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REv Ew 332.
22. La. Act 139 of 1916 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 929].
23. "Art. 92. Contributing to the Delinquency of Juveniles is the inten-
tional enticing, aiding, or permitting, by anyone over the age of seventeen,
of any child under the age of seventeen to: (1) ...
"(2) Associate with any vicious or disreputable persons, or frequent
places where the same may be found; or
"(3) Visit any place where spirituous or intoxicating liquors are the
principal commodity sold or given away; or ......
24. 201 La. 1055, 10 So. (2d) 894 (1942), noted In (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REvEw 327.
25. La. Act 59 of 1878, as amended by La. Act 162 of 1920 [Dart's Crim.
Stats. (1932) § 795].
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officers as may be necessary. '2 The instant decision was a nice
illustration of the sort of borderline cases which sometimes
make the distinction between a public "officer" and an "em-
ployee" a difficult one to draw.27 The Louisiana Criminal Code,
in common with many modem statutes,2 8 has found a solution to
this problem by enlarging the scope of the crime of public
bribery so as to include both public "officers" and "employees."
Venue B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
State v. International Paper Company1 was a prosecution for
polluting waters and killing fish in a bayou forming the boundary
between Bossier and Webster Parishes. The defendant operated
a paper mill in Webster Parish from which poisonous chemicals
were discharged. These waste materials were run into a settling
basin on the defendant's property, and from thence into a creek
which carried the waste water directly to the bayou which was
one mile distant. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that prose-
cution had properly been brought in Bossier Parish, on the
theory that the crime was committed at the point where waste
materials entered into the bayou. Chief Justice O'Niell empha-
sized the provisions of Article 14 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, which extends the jurisdiction of parish
courts to the center of any river, bayou or lake which forms the
parish boundary, and of Article 15 which gives either parish
jurisdiction where an offense is committed within one hundred
feet of the boundary line. He definitely indicated, by way of
dictum, that prosecution might also be had in Webster Parish.
No mention was made of Section 988 of the Revised Statutes of
1870 to the effect that where a crime is begun in one parish and
completed in another the offender may be tried in either of the
parishes. Applying this provision to the facts of the case at bar,
we have a crime begun in Webster Parish and completed in
Bossier Parish, with each parish being a proper place for prose-
cution of the offender. In such case the recent amendment to
26. State v. Sheffield, 201 La. 1055, 1059, 10 So. (2d) 894, 896 (1942).
27. See State v. Sheffield, 201 La. 1055, 10 So. (2d) 894 (1942), noted in
(1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REmEw 327, 328, for a discussion of the jurisprudence
in point.
28. Accord: Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1938) Art. 161; Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) Art. 27, § 27; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1939) § 12823.
29. La. Crim. Code, Art. 118.
1. 201 La. 870, 10 So. (2d) 685 (1942).
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Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure2 would also be
helpful.
In State v. Kavanaugh8 the crime of swindling an aged
widow out of valuable stock which she had inherited was
found to have been committed in the parish where the property
was obtained. The gist of such an offense is the obtaining of the
property, and it is immaterial where the fraudulent pretense is
uttered.
Jurisdiction and Venue-Maritime Offenses
The case of State v. Farroba4 raised a nice problem as to the
jurisdiction of this state over acts committed in the adjoining
waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Five defendants had been prose-
cuted for shrimping in Louisiana waters without having resided
in this state consistently for two years. The trial court had
overruled the defendant's plea of lack of jurisdiction and venue.
The defendant, however, had failed to except, choosing to rely
on his claim that the shrimping statute was unconstitutional. 5 On
a rehearing the supreme court again considered the original
claim that the alleged wrongful acts had been committed outside
the territorial limits of St. Mary's Parish and of the state of
Louisiana, and concluded that the trial court had been without
jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Higgins, speaking for the court, declared that
failure of the defendants to except to the trial court's ruling on
this issue did not prevent consideration of the issue, since the
lack of jurisdiction was patent on the face of the record. He
refused to decide the issue raised as to the constitutionality of
Act 55 of 1938 which operated to extend the territorial limits of
Louisiana twenty-seven miles out into the adjoining waters of
the Gulf of Mexico. On this point it may well be argued that
Louisiana cannot by such a statute "lift itself by its boot straps"
and extend its boundaries beyond those fixed when the Louisiana
territory was ceded by Spain to France and when the state of
2. La. Act 147 of 1942: "Art. 13 . . . provided that where the several acts
constituting a crime shall have been committed in more than one parish, the
offender may be tried in any parish where a substantial element of the crime
has been committed." See Comment (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 321.
3. 203 La. 1, 13 So. (2d) 366 (1943).
4. 201 La. 259, 9 So. (2d) 539 (1942).
5. The prosecution was brought under La. Act 5 of 1932, § 4, as amended
by La. Act 314 of 1940, § 3. On the first hearing of the case the majority of
the court upheld the trial court's ruling that this statute was unconstitutional
in that it drew an improper distinction between those who had resided in
Louisiana on June 1, 1940, and other fishermen. However, on a rehearing the
principal point discussed was the matter of venue and jurisdiction.
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Louisiana was admitted to the Union." The court's holding of
lack of jurisdiction was based principally upon a statement of
fact that the offense took place somewhere between the shore of
St. Mary's Parish, the line "being estimated" at twenty-five
miles distant. Justice Higgins declared that this statement left
the exact place where the crime was committed doubtful and
that it might well have been that the shrimping was carried on
more than twenty-seven miles from the Louisiana shore line and
therefore clearly outside of our territorial jurisdiction. 7 He also
raised the venue question as to just how the parish boundary
lines should be extended out into the waters of the Gulf of
Mexico in determining the limits of St. Mary's Parish.
Bail-Juvenile Proceedings
Article I, Section 12, of the Louisiana Constitution provides
that "all persons" shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except
those "charged with a capital offense, where the proof is evident
or the presumption great." In State v. Franklin8 the court held
that this provision was applicable to juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, and affirmed a writ of mandamus ordering the juvenile
judge to admit a juvenile offender to bail. In holding that such
offenders have the same right to bail pending trial as adult
offenders, Mr. Justice Ponder, who delivered the opinion in the
case, declared that special juvenile tribunals "were established
with the view of showing more consideration to the juvenile and
were not designed to deprive him of any of his constitutional
rights.""
A prior decision in State v. Clark" had held that a juvenile
offender does not have the same right to bail pending appeal as
6. 2 U.S. Stats. 641 (1811).
7. Cf. State v. Rabb, 130 La. 370, 372, 57 So. 1008, 1009 (1912). In that case
the defendant was charged with unlawfully operating a banking game on an
excursion boat called the "Belle of the Bends" which was operated on the
Mississippi River. The question was whether this was within the jurisdiction
of the State of Louisiana or within the exclusive admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States. Rather than decide this difficilt problem
of constitutional and statutory interpretation, Mr. Justice Monroe declared
"for aught that appears, save in defendant's pleadings, the 'Belle of the
Bends' may be a gambling house In the heart of the city of New Orleans.
And, as in the absence of any showing to the contrary, we are bound to
presume the existence of the facts necessary to the jurisdiction exercised by
the trial court, there is no basis upon which the legal proposition presented
by defendant can be considered." It will be noted that in the Rabb case the
ambiguity and uncertainty was resolved in favor of the trial court's
jurisdiction.
8. 202 La. 439, 12 So. (2d) 211 (1943).
9. 202 La. at 443, 12 So. (2d) at 213.
10. 186 La. 655, 173 So. 137 (1937).
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does the adult offender.1 This distinction between the right of
juvenile and adult offenders to bail pending appeal was based on
a special constitutional provision 12 to the effect that appeal from
a judgment in the juvenile court shall not suspend such judg-
ment. (Appeal has the effect of suspending the judgment ap-
pealed from in ordinary criminal cases.) This special provision
as to the effect of appeals in juvenile cases had been construed as
prevailing over the general constitutional right to bail. The
Clark case was properly distinguished from the case at bar, which
involved the right to bail pending trial.
Prescription
Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure13 provides that
all, except a few stated offenses, prescribe within one year "after
the offense shall have been made known to the judge, district
attorney or Grand Jury having jurisdiction." It has been con-
strued as sufficient that the district attorney had knowledge of
facts from which he should have known of the crime.14 How-
ever, the supreme court has recently held' 5 that where the victim
of a swindle delayed filing charges upon the offender's promise
to return the goods fraudulently obtained, the prescriptive period
did not run. It is official knowledge and not knowledge of the
victim which initiates the prescriptive period.
The prescription article also provides that "in felony cases
when three years elapse from the date of finding an indictment,
or filing an information .... it shall be the duty of the district
,attorney to enter a nolle prosequi if the accused has not been
tried." In State v. Theard8 an information for embezzlement
had been filed in August, 1936, but a plea of present insanity had
been upheld and the court had ordered the defendant committed
to an institution for the insane. In March, 1943, defendant moved
the lower court to nolle prosequi the bill of information on the
ground that the three year prescriptive period had elapsed with-
out his b~ing brought to trial. The lower court's refusal to nolle
prosequi was affirmed by the supreme court, which pointed out
that the purpose of this provision was "to enforce the right of
11. An adult offender is given a right to bail pending appeal, where a
minimum sentence of less than five years has been imposed. La. Const. of
1921, Art. I, § 12, as amended by La. Act 189 of 1936, § 1.
12. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 96.
13. As amended by La. Act 47 of 1942, § 1.
14. State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793 (1941).
15. State v. Kavanaugh, 203 La. 1, 13 So. (2d) 366 (1943).
16. 203 La. 1026, 14 So. (2d) 824 (1943).
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an accused to a speedy trial and to prevent the oppression of
citizens by suspending criminal prosecutions over them for an
indefinite time as well as to prevent delays in the administration
of justice by imposing on judicial tribunals an obligation of
proceeding with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
accusations."17
The court also declared that any other interpretation would
be in conflict with Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which expressly prohibits the trial of an accused who has been
adjudged insane, until he is sufficiently able to understand the
proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. The provision
in Article 8, being of a general nature, would not be construed
as effecting an implied repeal of the more specific provision
found in Article 267. The plain logic of th thing clearly sup-
ports the court's position that the three year prescriptive period
does not run during such time as the defendant is mentally
incapable of standing trial.
Insanity at the Time of the Crime-Triable Only by Jury
A distinction is recognized between the plea of present insan-
ity and the plea of insanity at the time of the crime. Where an
offender charged with a felony pleads insanity at the time of the
crime (inability to distinguish right from wrong) the defense
involves a question of fact as to guilt or innocence and must be
tried by a jury.18 The question of present insanity, however,
raises only a question of the defendant's fitness to stand a trial.
This question may be properly disposed of by the trial judge.19
In State v. Sample," the accused, charged with murder, had
entered a plea of insanity at the time of commission of the
alleged offense and a plea of present insanity. The trial judge
had upheld both pleas and ordered him confined to the State
Hospital for the Insane. The defendant subsequently urged that
he had regained his sanity and was ready to stand trial, but the
district judge refused to order a hearing to determine whether
the defendant was presently able to understand the proceedings
against him and to assist in his defense thereof. The supreme
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to
hold a hearing as to the defendant's present mental condition, as
provided for in Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
17. 203 La. at 1030, 14 So. (2d) at 825.
18. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
19. Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
20. 203 La. 841, 14 So. (2d) 678 (1943), noted in (1943) 18 Tulane L.Rev. 329.
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The court pointed out that the trial court's original ruling on the
* issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense was null and void. The issue presented was one affecting
guilt or innocehce which could only be decided by a jury. As a
result, the only valid part of the original order was the defen-
dant's commitment to the State Hospital for the Insane on the
ground of present insanity. This is a matter which is reviewable,
if the defendant's mental condition should change and he should
subsequently become capable of standing trial.
Short Form Indictment for Theft
Probably the most significant forward step taken in the 1942
Louisiana Criminal Code2 1 is found in the theft article2 2 which
combines all the various and sundry stealing crimes in one
offense. The technical distinctions between larceny, embezzle-
ment, and obtaining property by false pretenses were largely a
result of historical accident, rather than any substantial differ-
ences between those crimes.2 3 The principal and common element
of these various offenses is that the offender has wrongfully
taken or obtained something belonging to another. Thus the new
theft article includes all cases where one person takes or mis-
appropriates another's property. In order that this change might
be fully effective in eliminating the technical distinction between
the various stealing crimes, Article 235 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was amended 24 to provide a short form indictment
21. La. Act 43 of 1942 [Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) §§ 740.1-
740.144).
22. La. Crim. Code, Art. 67.
23. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW
6, 37: "It is well known that the separate crime of embezzlement arose out
of the Inadequacies of the crime of larceny. Larceny was formerly a capital
offense and as such was strictly limited in scope. With a lessening of the
penalty for larceny, the old restrictions remained. Thus early courts indulged
in such familiar fictions as the doctrine of 'breaking the bulk' to catch the
bailee who turned thief; or as the doctrine of 'constructive possession' to
catch the servant who stole his master's goods. When these devices failed
the legislatures stepped in and created the separate, but very similar, crime
of embezzlement. The distinction between 'larceny by trick' and obtaining
property by false pretenses, depending upon whether the owner intended to
part with 'possession' or 'property' in the goods, is also largely a product of
historical accident. Then, too, when none of the above crimes seemed to
fit, ingenuous district attorneys might insert a count for violation of the
'confidence game' statute. The above sketchy summary gives only a partial
picture of the confusion as to the stealing crimes. Distinctions had been
heaped upon distinctions, and then any number of special statutory classifica-
tions superimposed; and only partial relief had been secured by liberal pro-
cedural rules as to responsible verdicts." (See Art. 246, La. Code of Crin.
Proc. of 1928.)
24. La. Act 147 of 1942 amended Art. 235 of the La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928 so as to synchronize the short forms of indictment with the new
Louisiana Criminal Code.
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for theft as follows: "Theft-A.B. committed a theft of one
horse of a value of one hundred dollars (describe property the
subject of theft and state its value)." It is no longer necessary
for the district attorney, when drawing up an information or
indictment, to make the sometimes difficult and technical choice
between the formerly separate crimes of larceny, embezzlement,
obtaining by false pretenses and the confidence game.25 The
crime charged is "Theft," and if defense counsel needs further
and more specific facts he may request a bill of particulars.
In State v. Kendrick26 the indictment purported to charge
the defendants with theft, but, for some reason or other, the
simplified form was not used. In reviewing the sufficiency of
the indictment, the Louisiana Supreme Court took'the view
that Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
authorized the phrasing of an indictment in the exact language
of the statute, had no applicability to crimes like "Theft," where
several formerly separate offenses have now been cumulated in
the one offense. Where the short form authorized by Article 235
is not used, the indictment must clearly and specifically show
the nature of the type of theft charged. The language of the
indictment of the case at bar did not sufficiently show the precise
nature of the offense charged.
It would appear from the Kendrick decision that the safest
and most logical practice in charging the crime of theft is to use
the short form indictment provided in amended Article 235 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
An even more serious problem is presented by the cases of
State v. Hebert 7 and State v. Morgan 8 where the respective
offenses of indecent behavior with juveniles2 and disturbing
the peace"' were charged. It was held that since these were
offenses which could be committed in more than one way, the
informations were defective in not stating the specific manner
in which the offenses were committed; and that an information
couched in the language of the statute was insufficient. It
appears that a completely satisfactory solution of this problem
may be had only by amending Article 235 of the Code of Crim-
25. See discussion of State v. Doucet and State v. Savoy, p. 554, supra.
26. 203 La. 63, 13 So. (2d) 387 (1943).
27. 17 So. (2d) 3 (La. 1944).
28. 204 La. 499, 15 So. (2d) 866 (1943).
29. La. Crim. Code, Art. 81.
30. La. Crim. Code, Art. 103.
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inal Procedure so as to provide short form indictments for all
offenses denounced in the Criminal Code.
Indictment-Bill of Particulars
State v. Sheffield3' applied the rule of Article 288 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure that the accused is not entitled to a
bill of particulars as a matter of right and that the trial judge
has a very wide discretion in ruling on a motion to require the
district attorney to furnish additional data regarding the particu-
lars of the offense charged. In that case defendant was indicted
for obtaining money upon a promise to improperly influence
the official action of a municipal officer.3 2 The trial judge had
refused to require the district attorney to furnish a bill of par-
ticulars setting out the name and title of the municipal officer
sought to be influenced. In upholding the lower court's ruling,
Justice Ponder relied on Article 288 and prior Louisiana juris-
prudence for the well settled proposition that "the matter of
furnishing a bill of particulars rests largely within the discretion
of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed unless
there is manifest error, and particularly in the absence of a clear
showing that the defendant was prejudiced. '33
Indictm-nents-Cumulation of Thefts
In cases of embezzlement Article 225 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure authorized the charging, in one indictment and in one
count, the aggregate amount embezzled by an employee during
the entire time of his holding office; and further provided that
this aggregate amount should determine the grade of the offense
charged. Since this provision amounted to substance rather than
procedure insofar as it attempted to authorize cumulation of
several embezzlements to determine the grade of the crime, it
was to that extent unconstitutional.3 4 In 1940, Article 225 was
re-enacted as substantive law in order to validate the article
insofar as it affected substance rather than procedure.
A problem as to the scope and application of this new
statute arose in State v. Doucet.35 In that case a sheriff had been
indicted for the embezzlement of public funds, an ungraded
31. 201 La. 1055, 10 So. (2d) 894 (1942).
32. La. Act 59 of 1878, as amended by La. Act 162 of 1920 [Dart's Crim.
Stats. (1932) § 795]. Under the Criminal Code (La. Act 43 of 1942), the crime
would have been Public Bribery (Article 118).
83. 201 La. 1055, 1058, 10 So. (2d) 894, 895 (1942).
34. State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931).
35. 202 La. 1074, 13 So. (2d) 353 (1943).
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offense.36 The various embezzlements were accumulated in one
count as provided in the re-enacted Article 225. Defense counsel
filed a motion to quash, arguing that Article 225 was not
applicable to the ungraded crime of embezzlement by public
officers, but only applied to the general embezzlement statute
which was graded. While the trial judge did not quash the indict-
ment, he did agree with defense counsel's argument that Article
225 was not applicable to the ungraded offense charged, and
ordered a severance so that the various embezzlements would be
charged in separate counts. On appeal the majority of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court annulled the order requiring a severance, hold-
ing that Article 225 was applicable and that the entire amount
embezzled might be cumulated in one count. The court pointed
out that the amount embezzled would be material in determin-
ing the fine which might be imposed. Justices Fournet, Ponder,
and Higgins dissented. The question will be an academic one
in the future. Article 67 of the 1942 Criminal Code covers all
sorts of misappropriations, whether public or private, and espe-
cially provides that the offense shall be graded, as were the old
general larceny and embezzlement statutes, according to the
amount misappropriated or taken. The last paragraph of this
article' also provides that:
"When there has been misappropriation or taking by a
number of distinct acts of the offender, the aggregate of the
amount of the misappropriations or takings shall determine
the grade of the offense."
It will be noted that this is even a little more liberal than was
the substantive statute enacted to achieve the same purpose in
1940, since it does not require that the misappropriations or
takings be from the same person or that they be limited to a
six months' period.
Service of Indictment and Jury Lists on Defendant
All rules of criminal procedure, unfortunately, are not to be
found in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928. Prior rules,
not covered or expressly repealed, are still effective.3 7 The
reauirement of Section 992 of the old Revised Statutes 8 that the
defendant must be served a copy of the indictment and list of
36. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 903-904 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§
912-913).
37. Comment (1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 135-136.
38. Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) § 602.
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petit jurors at least two days prior to the trial was held applic-
able in State v. McKinney9 despite the fact that it was not
included in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court took the
view that the mere omission of the section did not make it
contrary to or in conflict with the Code; ignoring the fact that
the requirements of publication of the jury list in the paper and
that the indictment must be read to the defendant at the arraign-
ment before trial, provided adequate protection for the accused.
It might logically have been presumed that the provision in
question was purposely omitted. In the recent case of State v.
Hoover- failure to comply with the requirements of Section 992
of the Revised Statutes was again urged as the basis of an
appeal. However, the state pointed out that this provision was
inapplicable since the crime (shooting with intent to kill) was
not a capital offense or one "punishable with imprisonment at
hard labor for seven years or upward." Thus, technicality was
overcome by technicality and the conviction appealed from
affirmed.
Motion to Quash Jury Venire
In State v. Livaudais4 the district attorney applied to the
supreme court for peremptory writs of mandamus and prohi-
bition, seeking to set aside the order of the trial judge quashing
the grand jury and petit jury venires. The trial judge had
quashed jury venires prepared by a jury commission appointed
by his predecessor who was of a different political faction. He
assigned as his reasons therefor that the venire lists had been
prepared in the unfavorable atmosphere "of a bitter political
strife in progress at the time," and that the venire men were
not evenly divided between the various wards in the parish.
Relying heavily upon the provision in Article 203 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure that no jury venire shall be set aside
because of any "defect or irregularity in the manner of selecting
the jury, or in the composition, summoning or proceedings of the
Jury Commission, unless some fraud has been practiced or some
great wrong committed that would work irreparable injury,"
the supreme court set aside the order quashing the jury venire
and directed the trial judge to proceed with the impanelling of
grand and petit juries from the venire lists prepared by the jury
commission. On the facts, as we glean them from the supreme
39. 171 La. 549, 131 So. 667 (1930).
40. 203 La. 181, 13 So. (2d) 784 (1943).
41. 201 La. 1083, 11 So. (2d) 1 (1942).
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court's opinion, the case very properly came within the meaning
and intendment of Article 203. However, it might have been
decided differently if it had been shown to the satisfaction of
the supreme court that the jury venire was made up entirely
of henchmen of one political faction. It would, however, require
very strong and specific proof to substantiate such a holding.
Improper Selection of Jury Venire-Waiver of Objection
In State v. Wilson42 a negro, convicted of rape of a white
woman and sentenced to death, appealed from the conviction. He
relied upon the trial judge's refusal to quash the indictment. The
motion to quash, if filed in proper time would have been sus-
tained, for the evidence of a systematic exclusion of negroes
from the general venire and grand jury was unmistakable.4 3
However, the trial judge ruled that the motion came too late,
since it was filed forty-five days after completion of the term of
the grand jury returning the indictment. Article 202 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure was controlling. It provides that all
objections to the manner of selecting any juror, jury or the
general venire must be urged "before the expiration of the third
judicial day of the term for which said jury shall have been
drawn, or before entering upon the trial of the case if it be begun
sooner; otherwise, all such objections shall be considered as
waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard.""
It was argued by defense counsel, and this view was sup-
ported by Chief Justice O'Niell's able dissenting opinion, that
Article 202 was inapplicable since the indictment in the case at
bar had not been found until after the expiration of the third
judicial day of the grand jury term, counting from the beginning
of the term. Such a view, while supported by a strict, literal
construction of the language of Article 202, and by a consider-
able number of prior judicial statements, would have rendered
Article 202 totally inapplicable in a large number of cases. The
majority of the court (Chief Justice O'Niell being the only dis-
senter) dealt somewhat liberally with the language of the statute.
Mr. Justice Higgins, writing for the court, declared that it was
the legislative intent to allow the motion to quash the indict-
ment for irregularity in the drawing of the grand jury or jury
venire "until three judicial days after the expiration of the term
42. 204 La. 24, 14 So. (2d) 873 (1943).
43. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757 (1939).
44. Italics supplied.
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of the grand jury, which.returned the indictment, have elapsed,
or before entering the trial of the case in the event the trial is
started sooner. '45  (Italics supplied.) The majority opinion
achieves a desirable practical result, and is probably in line with
the real intent of the draftsmen of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.' At the same time -it comes very close to judicial
legislation. "6
Excusing Jurors for Cause
Under Article 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "it is
within the sound discretion of the judge to excuse for cause
jurors of the regular venire. '47 In State v. Hoover48 the prospec-
tive juror excused was a second cousin of the defendant who
was charged with shooting with intent to kill. While the juror
had said that he believed he could decide fairly and impartially,
he also'said that he was not certain what influence his relation-
ship to the defendant might have on him, and that sitting on
the case might prove embarrassing. Applying Article 345, the
supreme court held that no abuse of discretion had been shown
and that the discharge of the juror did not constitute a reversible
error. The natural inference might follow that if the juror had
been capriciously discharged, as where the discharge was merely
as a favor to the juror, it might constitute an abuse of discretion
and be grounds for reversal. The general idea. that the trial court
exercised sound discretion in excusing jurors for cause must
be synchronized with the oft-stated maxim that "'The law gives
to the accused the right to object to an obnoxious juror, but does
not give him the right of selection. Hence the rejection of a
juror by a judge, even if erroneous, affords no legal ground for
complaint.' "49 This was nicely done in the somewhat recent
case of State v. Dallao.50 In that case the court reiterated the
general rule that the. right of a defendant "is that of eliminating
45. 204 La. 24, 14 So. (2d) 873, 882 (1943).
46. Chief Justice O'Niell summarizes the theory of his dissent very
clearly when he declares: "The trial judge made the 'third judicial day'
limitation upon the defendant's right to object to the manner of selecting or
drawing the jury venire applicable to the defendant's case by giving the
article a meaning which, in my humble opinion, the phraseology does not
justify. I cannot see how the phrase 'the third judicial day of the term' can
mean 'the third judicial day' after the expiration of the term." 204 La. 24,
14 So. (2d) 873, 886.
47. The causes for discharging jurors are specified in Articles 350
through 352.
48. 203 La. 181, 13 So. (2d) 784 (1943).
49. State v. Thompson, 116 La. 829, 833, 41 So. 107, 108 (1906).
50. 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937).
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incompetent jurors, not of selecting jurors of his choice"; 51 but
definitely indicated that the defendant would have a right to
complain of the excusing of jurors without proper cause if it
resulted in his being tried by an incompetent or partial jury.
Failure to Swear Jury-Method of Objection
In State v. Hoover" defendant moved for a new trial alleging
that the jury which convicted him had never been properly
sworn. Two of the jurors stated that "they did not remember
whether or not they had been properly sworn." Also, one of the
defendant's attorneys took the witness stand and testified that
the oath had not been administered to the first juror accepted. On
the other hand, the court reporter and the trial judge's per curiam
verified the statement in the official minutes that the "jury was
duly sworn." The supreme court concluded that the evidence
did not substantiate defendant's contention; and, also declared
that such an objection came too late, if raised for the first time
after verdict by a motion for a new trial. Mr. Justice Fournet
pointed out that "The guarantee under our constitution, Article
1, § 9, of a fair and impartial trial does not contemplate that an
accused can take advantage of technical errors committed during
the course of his trial while he sat idly by, without some showing
that the errors were prejudicial to his cause." 53 Such objections
must be raised at the time, and exception duly taken to adverse
rulings.
The court also held that a motion in arrest of judgment
would not lie, since there was no "substantial defect patent upon
the face of the record," and ascertainable without an examination
of the evidence.5 4
Jury-Revocation of Waiver
In lesser felonies triable by a bobtail (five man) jury, the
defendant may waive his constitutional right for a jury trial and.
elect to be tried by the judge alone.5 5 In State v. Williams 56 the
defendant charged with theft and receiving stolen things, ar-
raigned without benefit of counsel, had entered a plea of not
guilty and elected to be tried by the judge without a jury. Sub-
51. 187 La. at 411, 175 So. at 11.
52. 203 La. 181, 13 So. (2d) 784 (1943).
53. 203 La. at 191, 13 So. (2d) at 787.
54. Arts. 517 and 518, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
55. Art. 259, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
56. 202 La. 374, 11 So. (2d) 701 (1942).
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sequently, upon securing counsel, defendant sought to withdraw
the waiver and avail himself of a jury trial. The supreme court
reaffirmed the holding in an earlier case that, "'Whenever the
court is convinced that the waiver has been unadvisedly made,
and proper and timely application is made to withdraw it, it
would be the duty of the court to permit the revocation, and to
restore to the accused his constitutional right.' ,,57 In the instant
case defendant's motion to withdraw his waiver for a jury trial
had been filed promptly upon his securing the benefit of counsel,
and the court did not feel that a resultant four to six weeks
postponement of the trial until the next jury term was a sufficient
reason to deny the motion. The court very properly distinguished
the case of State v. Robinson where the motion to withdraw the
waiver of a jury had not been made until after conviction by the
judge trying the case.
New Trial-Credibility of Newly Discovered Evidence
Article 511 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limits the
right of accused to a new trial for newly discovered evidence to
cases where such evidence "is so material that it ought to produce
a different result than the verdict reached"; and, it has been
repeatedly held that the trial judge is vested with a wide dis-
cretion in granting or refusing a new trial on this ground.59
In State v. Saba 0 the newly discovered evidence, if true,
would certainly have called for a new trial;61 but, the trial judge
viewed the proffered testimony as untrustworthy and suspicious,
and so refused to order a new trial. On appeal, the supreme court
upheld the trial court's ruling as a proper exercise of judicial
discretion. Chief Justice O'Niell filed a lone dissent, arguing that
the weight and credibility of the newly discovered testimony
should have been submitted to a jury by the granting of a new
trial. Then, if such testimony was an obvious falsity, the new
witnesses would be subject to prosecution for the serious offense
of perjury; but, if the new evidence were true, the defendant
57. 202 La. at 379, 11 So. (2d) at 703.
58. 43 La. Ann. 383, 8 So. 937 (1891).
59. State v. Hunt, 4 La. Ann. 438 (1849); State v. Washington, 36 La. Ann.
341 (1884); State v. Pouncey, 182 La. 511, 162 So. 60 (1935).
60. 203 La. 881, 14 So. (2d) 751 (1943), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
RviEw 474.
61. The defendant had been convicted of simple kidnapping in picking
up and forcibly carrying a negro girl outside the city limits where she was
criminally assaulted. The new evidence was to the effect that eye witnesses
had seen the negro girl accost the defendant and his companions and ask
them for a date.
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should be freed and the veracity of his benefactors vindicated.
This view, however, is out of line with the general principle that
the propriety of and necessity for granting a new trial is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. He hears all the
evidence at the trial of the case, and is best able to evaluate the
materiality and credibility of the newly offered evidence. If
trial courts were to follow Chief Justice O'Niell's dissenting
opinion to its logical conclusion, the administration of justice
would be frequently impeded by unnecessary delay and expense
incidental to new trials based upon patently unreliable newly
discovered (or manufactured) evidence.
Appeal-Trial Court's Ruling on Sufficiency of Evidence
. Article 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
a new trial ought to be granted "whenever the verdict is con-
trary to the law and the evidence"; it has been held that, pursu-
ant to this mandate the trial judge can set aside a verdict if he
feels that the jury was wrong and entertains a reasonable doubt
as to the defendant's guilt.62
The trial court has a wide discretion in this matter and his
ruling on this question of fact is not reviewable, 3 since the
supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited
to questions of law.e4 In State v. Martinez" the defendant had
been convicted of the crime of possessing intoxicating liquor for
sale in a prohibition parish. He argued, on a motion for a new
trial, that the conviction was contrary to the law and the evi-
dence, having been based largely upon circumstances which he
felt were adequately explained. In affirming the conviction and
sentence the supreme court stressed the fact that it was without
jurisdiction to pass upon questions of fact relating to guilt or
innocence. The court did indicate, however, that it might set
aside a conviction if there was "no evidence at all tending to
prove" a particular essential fact. Chief Justice O'Niell succinctly
declares "The line drawn between an insufficiency of evidence
and a total lack of evidence of the fact or facts required to prove
the guilt of the party accused. '66 Similarly the court refused to
examine the record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain two other convictions for
62. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928).
63. State v. Carter, 197 La. 155, 1 So. (2d) 62 (1941).
64. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
65. 201 La. 949, 10 So. (2d) 712 (1942).
66. 201 La. at 953, 10 So. (2d) at 713.
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operating a blind tiger in prohibition territory. 7 In State v.
Dow,68 where there was some evidence to support a conviction
of theft, the supreme court refused to inquire into its sufficiency.
However, where there was no evidence on some essential ele-
ment of the offense, a question of law arises which the supreme
court may decide.
6
Appeal-Necessity of Motion for New Trial
Article 559 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
expressly declares that "no new trial can be granted on appeal
unless a motion for same has been made and refused in the
lower court." However, in capital cases the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not seen fit to apply this provision rigidly. In State v.
Richard,7" a murder case, bills of exception had been filed urging
that no overt act had been shown and that the conviction was
based upon hearsay. The supreme court considered these bills on
appeal, despite the fact that the defendant had failed to move for
a new trial in the district court. Mr. Justice Rogers stressed the
serious nature of the case and pointed out that, while the supreme
court might have properly dismissed the bills of exception, the
result would have been to deprive the defendant of his right to
appeal because his attorney inadvertently failed to file a motion
for a new trial. It is presumed, however, that the supreme court
will not condone the departures from the procedure expressly set
out in Article 559, except in capital cases.
Appellate Jurisdiction-Misdemeanor Cases
The supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in misdemeanor
cases, as set out in Section 10 of Article VII of the Louisiana
Constitution, is limited to convictions where the offender has
been sentenced to serve more than six months in jail or fined in
excess of $300. Even where a lesser fine or sentence of imprison-
ment has been imposed, however, the supreme court has appel-
late jurisdiction if a local ordinance has been declared unconsti-
tutional or when a fine imposed by such an ordinance is con-
tested.71 In State v. Schimpf,7 2 the defendants had been convicted
67. State v. Moody, 201 La. 1042, 10 So. (2d) 890 (1942); State v. Drew,
202 La. 8, 11 So. (2d) 12 (1942).
68. 203 La. 707, 14 So. (2d) 610 (1943).
69. State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59, 11 So. (2d) 404 (1942).
70. 203 La. 722, 14 So. (2d) 615 (1943).
71. This provision for appellate jurisdiction is also found in La. Const. of
1921, Art. Vii, § 10, par. 6.
72. 203 La. 839, 14 So. (2d) 677 (1943).
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under a state statute 3 making it a crime to sell intoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes in a parish where sale of such
liquor was prohibited by law. The sentences imposed were not
sufficient to give appellate jurisdiction, but they relied upon the
fact that the validity of the police jury ordinance prohibiting the
sale. of intoxicants had been attacked. In dismissing the appeal
the supreme court pointed out that defendants had been prose-
cuted and convicted under a state statute, and not under the
police jury ordinance in question. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented
on the ground that a question of the constitutionality or legality
of the parish ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors was a fundamental issue in the case. Much might be said
on either side regarding this nice question of constitutional
interpretation, but neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting
chose to analyze the language of Section 10, Article VII, in any
great detail. The writer is inclined to agree with Chief Justice
O'Niell, for the validity of the convictions would ultimately be
based upon the legality of the parish ordinance prohibiting the
possession and sale of intoxicating liquors.
Sentencing Under the Old Indeterminate Sentence Provision
The case of State v. Broussard74 provides another illustration
of the difficulties which arose under the old indeterminate sen-
tence provision in Article 529 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure. Broussard had been convicted of carnal knowledge
(of a juvenile) and sentenced on July 7, 1942, to serve five years
at hard labor. He brought habeas corpus proceedings, question-
ing the legality of his sentence and contending that the trial
judge should have given an indeterminate sentence, instead of a
fixed or straight sentence. The Louisiana Supreme Court set
aside the sentence and remanded the case in order that an
indeterminate sentence might be imposed. If the proceedings
had been had after the effective date of Act 46 of 1942, the
sentence imposed would have been entirely proper; for Article
529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended by that
statute so as to require specifically that all sentences be deter-
minate ones.
Under the old indeterminate sentence provision in Article
529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge was required
to impose an "indeterminate sentence" for all crimes except those
73. La. Act. 15 of 1934 [Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) §§
1362.1-1362.32].
74. 201 La. 839, 10 So. (2d) 636 (1942); 202 La. 458, 12 So. (2d) 218 (1942).
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for which the maximum penalty did not exceed one year, and
certain enumerated offenses. Then, after the offender had served
the minimum time of his sentence he could apply for parole.
Much confusion resulted in interpreting those specified offenses
for which an indeterminate sentence was not to be imposed. The
Broussard case was a typical example of this. The trial judge
had taken the erroneous view that the crime of carnal knowledge
was "statutory rape" and, therefore, excepted from the benefits
of the indeterminate sentence provision as included in the crime
of "rape." Similarly, sentencing judges had experienced consid-
erable difficulty as to the excepted crimes of "arson" and
"burglary." There were a number of statutes dealing with these
crimes, and it was not clear as to whether some of the lesser
arson and burglary crimes were to be excepted from the benefits
of the indeterminate sentence with its ultimate possibility of
parole. As a result of such misunderstandings as to the scope of
the indeterminate sentence law a considerable number of pris-
oners were incarcerated in the state penitentiary under flat
sentences for crimes which called for indeterminate sentences.75
The amendment to Article 529, in conjunction with the new
parole law, which was also enacted in 1942,76 eliminates these
uncertainties and provides a logical pattern for sentencing and
parole. Article 529 now provides that all sentences imposed by
the court shall be determinate ones. This amended article is to
be read in connection with the provision of the new parole statute
to the effect that every prisoner is entitled to apply for parole
after he has served one-third of the sentence imposed.
Sentencing Procedure
A very unusual sentencing procedure was followed in State
v. Rider.77 The defendant had entered pleas of guilty upon three
separate criminal charges and had thrown himself upon the
mercy of the court. The trial judge immediately sentenced him
to serve from six to eighteen months upon the first charge of
perjury, and "deferred" sentence upon the other two charges of
procuring others to commit perjury. Ten days after his incar-
ceration upon the sentence for perjury, defendant was released
75. See Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the Criminal (1942) 5 Louisi-
ANA LAW REviEw 53, 66, where the writer discusses the old indeterminate
sentence law and points out that according to state penitentiary records of
April 30, 1940, forty-six prisoners were incarcerated under flat sentences for
crimes which required indeterminate sentences.
76. La. Act 44 of 1942 [Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) §§
725.1-725.14 n.].
77. 201 La. 733, 10 So. (2d) 601 (1942).
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and permitted to return to his home. Approximately two years
later he was again brought before the court which ordered him
to finish his original perjury sentence, with credit for the ten
days actually served; and the deferred sentences for procuring
perjury were renewed with defendant being ordered to serve
sentences of six months to two years "to run consecutively with
the first sentence."
Defense counsel argued that the first perjury sentence could
not be recalled because the eighteen months period of that sen-
tence had already elapsed. The supreme court very properly
held that "the expiration of the time without imprisonment is in
no sense an execution of the sentence. The sentence imposed
upon relator in this case not having been executed, it was proper
for the court, if it saw fit, to recall relator to the bar and order
that the sentence imposed upon him be executed.
'78
Defendant Rider's attorneys also objected to the court's
belated imposition of sentenceupon the two charges of procuring
perjury, the sentences being imposed after a lapse of two years
from conviction. Here Article 521 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure was controlling. It provides that accused has a right to
insist that the court deliberate at least twenty-four hours before
imposing sentence; but it also expressly stipulates that the trial
court shall have an absolute discretion, and "not subject to the
review of any other court or judge," to grant a longer delay
between conviction and sentence. Thus the two year delay,
while very unusual and certainly not commendable judicial prac-
tice, was clearly authorized by law.
A number of errors in the sentences were treated as minis-
terial and cured by a consideration of the entire record on appeal.
The sentences imposed for conviction on the second and third
charges were for perjury, while defendant had actually been
convicted of procuring others to commit perjury. The supreme
court held that while the sentences must be responsive to the
verdict, the error was not fatal since a reading of the record
clearly showed the real offense and the term of the, sentence
imposed was appropriate. The three sentences also failed to
clearly indicate whether they were to be served consecutively
or concurrently, but the supreme court held that the ambiguity
did not vitiate the sentences in view of the fact that the trial
judge had the inherent power at any time to order the record
amended to correct the mistake and clarify the matter.
78. 201 La. at 743, 10 So. (2d) at 604.
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Method of Execution
Act 14 of 194071 substituted more humane electrocution for
the traditional "hanging by the neck until he is dead" method
of executing capital offenders. In the much litigated Henry80 and
Burks8 l cases defense counsel, grasping at the proverbial last
straw, sought to interpret this statute so as to effect legislative
reprieve for these two convicted murderers. In Henry v. Reid 2
Mrs. Henry had been sentenced to suffer death "in manner pro-
vided by law." When, after several appeals and consequent
delays, the time for execution arrived, the new electrocution law
was in effect and the governor very properly issued a warrant
for her execution by that method. The supreme court held that
the warrant had been issued "in the manner provided by law,"
and went on to point out that the sentence need not go further
and specify the exact mode of execution. In State v. Burkss3 the
sentence had been more specific and stated that Burks should
suffer the death penalty by being "langed by the neck until dead"
in conformity with the execution law in effect at that time. Pend-
ing final disposition of the case on appeal, the new statute went
into effect and the trial court amended the sentence so as to make
it conform with the then lawful method of inflicting capital pun-
ishment by electrocution. In sustaining the trial court's action, the
supreme court again pointed out that it was not necessary for
the sentencing judge to refer to the method of executing the
penalty. The important part of the sentence was that the offender
should suffer the penalty of death as punishment for the crime
committed.
Habitual Offender Statute-Foreign Convictions
The Louisiana Habitual Offender statute84 defines a multiple
offender so as to include the person who has been previously
convicted under the law of any other state "of a crime which, if
committed within this state, would be a felony." State v.
79. An act amending Arts. 569 and 570 of the La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928.
80. Henry v. Reid, 201 La. 857, 10 So. (2d) 681 (1942). See also State v.
Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 271, 279.
81. State v. Burks, 202 La. 167, 11 So. (2d) 518 (1942).
82. 201 La. 857, 10 So. (2d) 681 (1942). Accord: Iles v. Flournoy, 202 La.
20, 11 So. (2d) 16 (1942).
83. 202 La. 167, 11 So. (2d) 518 (1942).
84. La. Act 15 of 1928, repealed and re-enacted by La. Act 45 of 1942
[Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) §§ 709.1-709.5].
[Vol. V
1944] WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 579
Vaccaro85 established the logical interpretation that the foreign
conviction must be for such an offense as would have been a
felony under Louisiana law. In State v. Johnson" decided just
one year later, the court held that a New York conviction of
larceny in the sum of one hundred dollars, which was a mis-
demeanor by the laws of New York but which would have been
a felony if committed in Louisiana, did not render the offender
a habitual criminal when he was subsequently convicted of
another felony in this state. It was held that the word "crime,"
used in relation to offenses committed elsewhere, should be
interpreted to mean a foreign felony and not to include a mis-
demeanor. The net result of this decision is that the prior for-
eign conviction must be for an offense which would have been
a felony if committed in Louisiana (Vaccaro decision) and which
was also a felony by the law of the state where it was committed
(Johnson case). While no foreign decision in point can be cited,
it is submitted that the court's interpretation of the word "crime"
in the Johnson decision places a unique and unintended restric-
tion upon the Louisiana habitual offender statute. A natural
reading of that statute indicates that the legislature intended to
judge the foreign offense according to Louisiana standards. The
court's interpretation of the word "crime" is also out of line with
the natural interpretation of that word and with prior Louisiana
jurisprudence . 7
The Petition IV. PROCEDURE
One of the most important cases decided by the supreme
court during the past year in the field of procedure was Johnston
v. Burton.' This case held that both the administrator and the
heirs are necessary parties defendant in a partition proceeding
brought against a succession; and that any judgment obtained
when the proceeding is directed solely against the administrator
is an absolute nullity. The court took notice of the recognized
85. 200 La. 475, 8 So. (2d) 299 (1942), discussed in The Work of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for the 1941-1942 Term (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
193, 258.
86. 202 La. 926, 13 So. (2d) 268 (1943), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISINA LAW
REVIEW 471.
87. State v. DIckerson, 139 La. 147, 152, 71 So. 347, 349 (1916) states that
"A crime Is: 'An act or omission which is prohibited by law as injurious to
the public and punished by the state.'" Accord: State v. Heuchert, 42 La.
Ann. 270, 7 So. 329 (1890); State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 749, 84 So. 41, 52
(1920). Article 7 of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 states that "a crime
is that conduct which is defined as criminal in this Code, or in other acts of
the legislature or in the constitution of this State."
1. 202 La. 152, 11 So.(2d) 513 (1942).
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rule that real actions may be brought against the administrator
of an in intestate succession alone, but stated that a suit for
partition is an exception to this rule.2
In the case of In re Nunez3 disbarment proceedings were
brought. The defendant filed exceptions of no right and no cause
of action. In sustaining the defendant's exceptions the well set-
tled rule was followed that all records, exhibits, or documents
annexed to and incorporated in a petition control the allegations
of fact founded thereon.4
In re Phoenix Building and Homestead Association5 was a
case in which the homologation of two creditors' claims was
sought to be nullified. The court refused the relief prayed for,
stating that it is too well recognized to cite authorities that mere
conclusions of the pleader, not supported by any facts, fails to
state a cause of action."
In State ex rel. Jones, Governor v. Saucier7 it was held that
a suit brought against a sheriff for taxes or fees collected, but not
turned over to the state or parish treasuries, must be brought in
the name of the governor of the state; but any other suits prose-
cuted against a sheriff for embezzled funds must be brought in
the name of the party injured thereby.
Gilmore v. Rachl involved a petition filed in forma pauperis.
The plaintiff and her husband owned two lots of ground and a
house valued at $1100, on which there was a mortgage for $860.
Her husband was earning $137.50 a month. This included all of
their assets, against which they owed numerous debts. The trial
court refused her petition, holding that her financial condition
was not such as would qualify her to file suit under the act pro-
viding for such procedure.9 In reversing the trial court, the su-
preme court followed the rule previously announced in Fils v.
2. With the exception of the old case of Veazy v. Trahan, 26 La. Ann.
606 (1874), the jurisprudence had held that the heirs were necessary parties
defendant in a partition suit only when an executor was involved. In the
principal case the court stated that the rule was just as applicable to an ad-
ministrator as an executor, basing their reasoning primarily upon Article
1320 of the Civil Code.
3. 203 La. 847, 14 So.(2d) 680 (1943).
4; Accord: Alliance Trust Co. v. Paggi-Streater Co., 173 La. 356, 137 So.
60 (1931); Claiborne v. Lezina, 175 La. 635, 144 So. 131 (1932).
5. 203 La. 565, 14 So.(2d) 447 (1943).
6. Accord: Haas v. Johnson, 203 La. 697, 14 So.(2d) 607 (1943).
7. 203 La. 954, 14 So.(2d) 775 (1943).
8. 202 La. 652, 12 So.(2d) 669 (1943).
9. La. Act 156 of -1912, as amended by La. Acts 260 of 1918, 165 of 1934,
and 421 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1400-1402].
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Iberia, St. M. & E. R. Co.,'0 namely, that to file suit in forma pau-
peris a person does not have to be absolutely destitute. The only
requirement is that he is' not able to post a bond for the court
costs, or is not able to pay them as they accrue.
Exceptions, Rules, and Motions
During the past year only five cases were passed on by the
supreme court which involved questions concerning declinatory
exceptions. The first of these, Baton Rouge Building Trades
Council v. T. L. James and Company, Incorporated," was a suit
for specific performance. The defendants, being a partnership,
filed an exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione
personae, when only one of the partners was served with citation.
In disposing of the exception the court followed the trite rule
that an appearance for any purpose other than to allege want of
citation cures any defective citation and gives the court jurisdic-
tion to proceed. By dicta, the court said that even if the exceptor's
appearance was not a general one, the exception ratione personae
must fail, because service on one of the partners is sufficient to
bring the partnership into court. The exception ratione materiae
was not passed on, since it was not pressed by the defendant.
Two of the remaining four cases involved the exceptions to
jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae. In Fourth
Jefferson Drainage District v. City of New Orleans,2 the plaintiff
brought suit for trespass, alleging confiscation of certain real
property in Jefferson Parish by representatives of the defendant.
Defendant excepted to the court's jurisdiction ratione personae,
showing that though it was domiciled in Orleans Parish, suit had
been brought in Jefferson Parish. In overruling the exception, the
court applied Section 8 of Article 165 of the Code of Practice, in
holding that a suit for trespass on real property may be brought
either at defendant's domicile or where the property is located,
as the plaintiff may desire. The defendant, being a corporation,
tried to allege that the above article was not applicable to a cor-
poration, but this contention was quickly overruled. 8  Pic v.
Mente & Company, Incorporated,' involved the exception ratione
materiae. In sustaining the exception, the recognized rule was
followed that a party cannot give a court jurisdiction ratione
10. 145 La. 544, 554, 82 So. 697, 700 (1919).
11. 201 La. 749, 10 So.(2d) 606 (1942).
12. 203 La. 670, 14 So.(2d) 482 (1943).
13. O'Niell, Chief Justice, dissenting, but not handing down reasons.
14. 201 La. 237, 9 So.(2d) 532 (1942).
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materiae when it lacks jurisdiction over the total amount involv-
ed, by splitting his cause of action into two separate suits.15
In the last case to involve a declinatory exception" the plain-
tiff filed the exception of recusation, alleging that the judge had
participated in the illegalities for which the defendant was on
trial. The facts showed a clear cut case of interest on the judge's
part and therefore the exception was sustained under authority
of Section 1 of Article 338 of the Code of Practice. The defendant
contended that this article was open to a defendant only, but the
court correctly held that it was open to either the plaintiff or the
defendant in a case.1 7
Only one case'8 involved a question concerning the dilatory
exceptions (properly speaking). In that case the exception of in-
consistency, or improper accumulation of actions, was involved.
Since plaintiff had pleaded his several inconsistent demands in
the alternative only, the well recognized rule was followed that
such procedure is not objectionable and will not form the basis
for such an exception. 9
Five cases dealt with the peremptory exception. Two of
these O dealt with the exceptions of no right and no cause of ac-
tion and applied the general rule that for the purposes of the
trial of these exceptions all allegations of fact set out in the pe-
tition must be taken as true. However, the court correctly pointed
out that only allegations of fact, as distinguished from the plead-
er's mere conclusions, are accepted as true for this purpose.21
The three other cases dealing with peremptory exceptions
all involved the exceptions of res judicata. In Bullis v. Town of
Jackson,22 the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defend-
ant city for $300. He failed in his attempt to enforce it against
the city by mandamus proceedings. Then he sought to obtain a
15. Arts. 91, 156, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Kearney v. Fenerty, 185
La. 862, 171 So. 57 (1936).
16. State ex rel. Riddle v. Jeansonne, 203 La. 85, 13 So.(2d) 470 (1943).
17. The fifth case to involve a declinatory exception, Martin-Owsley, Inc.
v. Philip Freitag, Inc., 202 La. 554, 12 So.(2d) 270 (1943), followed Article 358
of the Code of Practice, and held that the filing of an exception to citation,
without answering to the merits does not join issue. Therefore the plaintiff
may thereafter amend his petition even when it changes the substance of his
demand.
18. Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So. (2d) 627 (1943).
19. Accord: Haas v. McCain, 161 La. 114, 108 So. 305 (1926); Mentz v.
Village of Mamou, 165 La. 1070, 116 So. 561 (1928).
20. In re Nunez, 203 La. 847, 14 So.(2d) 680 (1943); State ex rel. Jones,
Governor v. Saucier, 203 La. 954, 14 So.(2d) 775 (1943).
21. Accord: Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627,
157 So. 370, 95 A.L.R. 948 (1934).
22. 203 La. 289, 14 So.(2d) 1 (1943).
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writ of garnishment against an account which the defendant had
in a bank in that city. The defendant pleaded res judicata to the
proceedings, which was upheld by the trial court. The district
court's holding was reversed by the supreme court, however,
since the four requirements of res judicata28 were not present.
The court followed the well settled rule that the requirements
for res judicata are stricti juris and must in all cases be adhered
to. Thus the defendants in the mandamus proceeding and the
garnishment proceeding not being the same person, one of the
necessary elements was missing. In Moran v. Bechtel,24 'the ex-
ception of res judicata was overruled for the same reason, except
that in this case the cause of action in the two suits was not the
,same. In re Phoenix Building & Homestead Association25 involved
an attack on the homologation of two creditor's claims in a liqui-
dation account. The plaintiff contended that the homologation of
the account did not give the claims the effect of res judicata, be-
cause it was done under authority of Act 44 of the Second Extra
Session of 193426 and amounted to no more than an ex parte or-
der. The court correctly held that judgments homologating ac-
counts are final and have the effect of things adjudged, the above
act constituting no exception.
Two cases involved motions. In the first, 27 plaintiff brought
suit on seven promissory notes. The defendant denied indebted-
ness to the plaintiff, but failed to allege facts to substantiate his
denial. He further failed to deny several of the paragraphs in the
plaintiff's petition. The plaintiff moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, which was granted. The court followed the rule under
the Pleading and Practice Act 28 that all material allegations not
specifically denied are admitted. Therefore, the defendant having
failed to deny any of the plaintiff's material allegations, and hav-
ing failed to allege facts to substantiate his denial of indebted-
ness, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings.
In the second case,29 the plaintiff filed a motion to strike0
certain allegations in the defendant's answer, which was sus-
23. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. 202 La. 380, 12 So.(2d) 1 (1942).
25. 203 La. 565, 14 So.(2d) 447 (1943).
26. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 744.34, 744.35.
27. Haas v. Johnson, 203 La. 697, 14 So.(2d) 606 (1943).
28. La. Act 300 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1483].
29. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co. v Oilfield Supply and Scrap Ma-
terial Co., 202 La. 787, 12 So.(2d) 819 (1943).
30. This pleading, although usually referred to as "a motion to strike,"
Is, in reality, a rule and not a motion under the Louisiana conception of a
motion as being ex parte.
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tained by the trial court. He then moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, and it was granted. The supreme court reversed the
trial court, however, and held that a motion to strike is foreign
to our procedure and unauthorized. Babst v. Hartz3 ' and Stanley,
Attorney General v. Jones 2 were cited as authority for the deci-
sion. A review of the jurisprudence is necessary to show the
trend which finally evolved into this decision. In Welsh v. Bar-
row88 and Babst v. Hartz,4 it was held that a motion to strike
will fail as to pertinent matter in the answer. In Vicknair v. Ter-
racina,5 which arose as late as 1927, a motion to strike was up-
held by our supreme court since the matter striken was imperti-
nent. Then in State ex rel. Sutton v. Caldwell, Mayor,30 the court
said that' a motion to strike is not authorized under our system
of pleading and practice, and the better practice is either to move
for a judgment on the pleadings or to object to the introduction
of any evidence to support any allegation which might be irrele-
vant. But the court did not say that such a motion was forbidden
in Louisiana. It followed the "pertinent test" established by the
above mentioned cases.8 Perez, District Attorney v. Meraux, Dis-
trict Judge8 was the first case to hold that such a motion would
not be allowed in Louisiana regardless of irrelevancy of the mat-
ter sought to be stricken and Stanley, Attorney General v. Jones9
affrmed that case. The principal case follows these last two cases
and seems to have settled once and for all that in no case is a
motion to strike permissible in Louisiana. After overruling the
motion to strike in this case, the judgment on the pleadings was
also reversed under the rule that all well pleaded allegations are
accepted as true in passing on such a motion.
The Answer and Incidental Demands
One case"0 involved the question of whether the filing of a
third opposition joins issue. The court in that case held that the
filing of a third opposition does not join issue, and therefore the
31. 161 La. 472, 108 So. 871 (1926).
32. 197 La. 627, 2 So.(2d) 45 (1941).
33. 9 Rob. 535 (La. 1845).
34. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Oilfleld Supply and Scrap Ma-
terial Co., 202 La. 787, 12 So.(2d) 819 (1943).
35. 164 La. 117, 113 So. 787 (1927).
36. 195 La. 507, 197 So. 214 (1940).
37. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana (1934)
9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 31-32.
38. 195 La. 987, 197 So. 683 (1940).
39. 197 La. 627, 2 So.(2d) 45 (1941).
40. Martin-Owsley v. Philip Freitag, Inc., 202 La. 554, 12 So.(2d) 270 (1943).
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plaintiff has an absolute right thereafter to file his amended
petition, whether it changes his cause of action or not."'
In Cason v. Cecil,42 one Aymond filed a third opposition and
prayed to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. The court or-
dered the sheriff to hold enough of the proceeds to pay his claim.
The sheriff, however, held only enough to pay the third person
the amount due him on the day of the sale, and turned the re-
mainder over to the plaintiff in the case. Upon being awarded
attorney fees and costs, plus the indebtedness due him, the third
party brought suit against the sheriff to recover the full amount
awarded him by the court. In holding the sheriff liable the su-
preme court said that when the court orders a sheriff to hold
enough out of the proceeds of a sale to pay a third opponent's
claim, he is personally liable to that person if he does not hold
enough to pay his claim in full, which includes attorney fees and
costs if awarded to him.41
Haas v. Johnson4 ' applied the well settled rule that a defend-
ant who does not deny in his answer his signature on a document
annexed to and declared on in the petition, admits its genuine-
ness.
4 5
The Trial
In Stanley, Attorney General v. Jones6 the trite rule was
followed that evidence admitted without objections, when it was
not admissible for any purpose under the pleadings, has the effect
of enlarging the pleadings and is considered as if formal plea of
it had been made in the petition. The recognized rule that the
presumption is against a litigant who fails to produce evidence
within his reach was also applied:47
Modification of Judgments in Trial Courts
In the case of Foster v. Kaplan Rice Mill, Incorporated,4 1 the
plaintiff was ordered to amend his petition by June 8, 1942, or be
non-suited. He did not comply with the order, and on June 13,
41. Art. 419, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Self v. Great Atlantic and Pa-
cific Tea Co., 178 La. 240, 151 So. 193 (1933).
42. 201 La. 890, 10 So.(2d) 692 (1942).
43. Art. 401, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Cf. Walmsley v. Theus, 107 La.
417, 31So. 869 (1901).
44. 203 La. 697, 14 So.(2d) 606 (1943).
45. Art. 324, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Art. 2244, La. Civil Code of
1870. Cabral v. Victor & Provost, Inc., 181 La. 139, 158 So. 821 (1934).
46. 201 La. 549, 9 So.(2d) 678 (1942).
47. Cf. Crescent City Ice Co. v. Erman, 36 La. Ann. 841 (1884).
48. 203 La: 245, 13 So.(2d) 850 (1943).
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1942, the defendant obtained, and the judge signed, an order dis-
missing plaintiff's suit as in the case of non-suit. On June 16,
1942, plaintiff moved for and obtained a new trial. The defendant
then appealed from the order granting the new trial, alleging
that the three days within which a party may move for a new
trial had elapsed when plaintiff applied for it. In overruling the
defendant's contention the court followed the general rule that
the delay within which a party may move for a new trial starts
running only from the day that the judgment was actually sign-
ed by the judge.49
Appeals and Appellate Procedure
This was the most fertile field of activity in Louisiana pro-
cedure during the. past year.
Five cases involve questions concerning the prosecution of
appeals. Two of these involved the question of whether appeals
should be dismissed on technicalities. In both, Louisiana's liberal
rule was followed; namely, that appeals are favored at law and
will be dismissed only when the grounds urged for the dismissal
are free from any doubt.50 In the first of these two cases51 the ap-
pellee sought to have the appeal dismissed because it was made
by motion and not signed in open court. The judge had signed it
in a room adjoining the court room, but while the court was in
session. The appellee's prayer for dismissal was refused. In the
second case5 2 the transcript did not state affirmatively that the
motion for appeal and the order granting it had been made and
signed in open court. The appellee sought to have it dismissed
on this ground. In refusing the dismissal the court held that the
fact the court was in session and that action on the motion was
taken in the same term of court as rendered the judgment ap-
pealed from, the presumption was that the motion was made and
signed in open court.58
The other three cases involving the prosecution of appeals
were all concerned with appeal bonds. Dickerson v. Hudson54 ap-
plied the recognized rule that an appeal will be dismissed unless
it is obtained and the appeal bond filed (when one is required)
49. Accord: Viator v. Heintz, 201 La. 884, 10 So.(2d) 690 (1942).
50. Police Jury of Parish of St. James v. Borne, 192 La. 1041, 190 So. 124
(1939).
51. McCann v. Todd, 201 La. 953, 10 So.(2d) 769 (1942).
52. Labarre v. Rateau, 203 La. 802, 14 So.(2d) 642 (1943).
53. Art. 573, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Gardiner v. Erskine, 170 La.
214, 127 So. 604 (1930).
54. 201 La. 915, 10 So.(2d) 700 (1942).
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within one year after the signing of the judgment 5 In Maddox
v. Butchee,56 appellee sought to have the appeal bond dismissed
because appellant had not signed it as principal, and because of
certain omissions in the bond. In refusing the motion to dismiss
the court said that as to appellant's failure to sign the bond as
principal, there was no error, because he was already personally
bound for the debt involved.57 And as to the omissions in the
bond, Act 284 of 19288 specifically provides that the appellant
must be given four days within which to correct them before the
appeal can be dismissed. Vienne v. Chalona 5  and McCain v.
Todd6" followed the rule that only where there are two separate
and distinct judgments rendered is it necessary to appeal from
both judgments separately and file two appeal bonds6 1
In one case during the past year,62 the rule was followed that
prescription begins to run only when a judgment is actually
signed by the judge, not when it is rendered from the bench.5
Three cases raised the question of whether an appeal lay to
the supreme court from the decree complained of. In the first6 4 the
court held that no appeal lies from an order granting a new trial,
when the application therefor was made within three judicial
days after the judgment was signed. The second case65 was a con-
solidation of two cases that had been brought to recover back
salaries from the state. The claim involved in each case was
$1,500. In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdictional amount
the recognized rule was followed that the jurisdiction of the court
55. Art. 593, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
56. 201 La. 876, 10 So.(2d) 687 (1942).
57. Accord: Fontini v. Pine Grove Land Co., 167 La. 137, 118 So. 865 (1927).
58. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1923.
59. 203 La. 450, 14 So.(2d) 54 (1943).
60. 201 La. 953, 10 So.(2d) 769 (1942).
61. In Vienna v. Chalona, two parties brought one suit for personal in-
juries received when defendant's car collided with theirs. Two judgments
were signed, but only one appeal was taken, and only one appeal bond was
filed. In reversing the court of appeal for the first circuit the supreme court
held that there was only one law suit, and therefore only one appeal and one
appeal bond was necessary, even though there were two plaintiffs and two
separate judgments rendered. Justice Rogers dissented from the majority
opinion. His dissent was based on the assumption that there were two law-
suits involved, not one. Therefore, two judgments being rendered, two ap-
peals and two appeal bonds would be necessary to bring the entire case be-
fore the supreme court.
62. Viator v. Heintz, 201 La. 884, 10 So.(2d) 690 (1942).
63. The court in the above case said by dicta, however, that when the
judgment is a money judgment and is rendered by the court of appeal, pre-
scription starts to run from the date the judgment is rendered, not from
the day it is signed.
64. Foster v. Kaplan Rice Mill, Inc., 203 La. 245, 13 So.(2d) 850 (1943).
65. State ex rel. Nunez v. Baynard, State Auditor, 203 La. 711, 14 So.(2d)
611 (1943).
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is not determined by the aggregate of all the claims consolidated,
but rather by the amount in dispute in each case. The appellant
raised an interesting point in this case. He contended that even
if the jurisdictional amount was not involved, the supreme court
had jurisdiction because a legislative act had been declared un-
constitutional. The court dismissed this contention by holding
that to declare the governor's veto null and void was not to de-
clare a legislative act null and void, and therefore the supreme
court was without authority to review the case. The appeal was
then transferred to the proper intermediate court under the ap-
plicable statutory authority.06 The third case on this subject was
Wall v. Close, Director of Finance,17 in which the supreme court
held that it was not an interference with the district court's orig-
inal jurisdiction to grant a suspensive appeal when the appellant
was entitled to it of right, and the district court had refused to
grant it.
In Edwards v. Hayes6 the well settled rule in Louisiana was
followed that our courts are without authority to render declara-
tory judgments. Therefore any question which has become moot
cannot be considered on appeal, and anything said concerning it
is pure dicta.69
State ex rel. Jones, Governor v. Edwards7,0 and Acosta v.
Nunez I applied the general rule that an appellate court is with-
out jurisdiction to consider any question which has not been pass-
ed on by the court of original jurisdiction, with the exception of
a few special cases provided for by our constitution, ' 2 none of
which were involved here. Therefore anything an appellate court
might say pertaining to such a matter is obiter dicta.7 3
In Lowell v. Fitzpatrick7 4 appellee answered the appeal by
praying that he be allowed to file a newly discovered document
which was very relevant to the case. It was apparent that the
document would have an important effect on the decision of the
case, and that the appellant would desire to rebut it with the evi-
dence if he could. Therefore, the case was remanded to the dis-
66. La. Act 56 of 1904, as amended by La. Act 19 of 1912 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 1427).
67. 201 La. 986, 10 So.(2d) 779 (1942).
68. 203 La. 433, 14 So.(2d) 48 (1943).
69. Accord: Chaffe v. City of Minden, 170 La. 266, 127 So. 623 (1930).
70. 203 La. 1039, 14 So.(2d) 829 (1943).
71. 203 La. 275, 13 So.(2d) 860 (1943).
72. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10(2).
73. Cf. Wilkinson v. Macheca, 158 La. 183, 103 So. 733 (1925).
74. 202 La. 545, 12 So.(2d) 267 (1943).
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trict court, as the supreme court can receive no new evidence
discovered since the judgment below.75 The same procedure was
followed in the case of Normand v. Davis.7
In the only other case to involve appeals and appellate pro-
cedure77 the appellant prayed that a sale be set aside because of
lesion. In his original petition, however, he had prayed that the
sale be decreed a simulation. In refusing to consider his new
prayer, the supreme court recognized the fact that it could not go
beyond the pleadings and grant a relief different from the one
prayed for in the trial court.
Supervisory Jurisdiction and Procedure
In First National Bank Building Company v. Dickson & Den-
ny 78 the trial court affirmed the plaintiff's exception of no cause
of action to the defendant's reconventional demand. The defend-
ant then notified the trial judge that he was going to apply to the
supreme court to review the decree under its supervisory juris-
diction, and asked that the proceedings be suspended until the
supreme court ruled on the matter. The trial court refused to stay
the proceedings. The defendant then applied for, and the supreme
court granted, the writs of mandamus, certiorari, .and prohibition.
The defendant contended that the proceedings had after he no-
tified the trial court of his application for the writs were void.
In denying his contention the court held that mere notice to the
court of one's intention to apply for supervisory writs will not be
sufficient to stay proceedings. It followed the well settled rule
that only when the writs are granted and served on the judge
are all subsequent acts of the trial court void.7 9 The court in this
case also recognized the rule that mandamus, prohibition, and
certiorari will lie even where an appeal also lies, if an appeal
would not afford adequate relief."0
The case of State ex rel. Conerly v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board8 ' held that no evidence can be considered under writs of
prohibition, certiorari, or mandamus. It affirmed the recognized
rule that only a review of the regularity of the proceedings and
75. Art. 894, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
76. 202 La. 565, 12 So.(2d) 273 (1942).
77. Bourgeois v. Bourgeois, 202 La. 578, 12 So.(2d) 278 (1943).
78. 202 La. 970, 13 So.(2d) 283 (1943).
79. Art. 863, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
80. Accord: State ex rel. Ruddock Orleans Cypress Co. v. Knop, 147 La.
1057, 86 So. 493 (1920).
81. 202. La. 1052, 13 So.(2d) 346 (1943).
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the jurisdiction of the court below can be had under the super-
visory writs.8 2
The only other case to involve the supervisory writs was the
case of Wilson v. Wilson.85 There the plaintiff asked for, and was
denied, a suspensive appeal from the district court's decision
concerning the custody of her minor child. She then applied to
the supreme court to mandamus the judge to grant the suspensive
appeal. In refusing her request the court held that in no such
case was the aggrieved party entitled to a suspensive appeal of
right-that when a devolutive appeal would not grant adequate
relief the only remedy open is to apply to the supreme court for
review under its supervisory jurisdiction.
Enforcement of Judgments
During the past year only one case arose which dealt with
the enforcement of judgments. In that case 4 the plaintiff sought
to enforce his judgment by garnishment proceedings, and the
garnishee contended that he had waived it by not obtaining a
judgment against the defendant and the garnishee at the same
time. The court correctly overruled this contention 5 and held
that garnishment proceedings are new suits and must be dealt
.with accordingly..
Conservative Writs
Bolding v. Veith 7 involved a petitory action in which the
court judicially sequestered the property in dispute. The defend-
ant proceeded by rule to have the order vacated, but failed. He
then applied to the supreme court for writs of certiorari, prohibi-
tion, and mandamus, which were granted with a stay order. In
ordering the sequestration vacated, the court followed the letter
of Article 274 of the Code of Practice, which states that judicial
sequestration can be granted only where one party has no
more apparent right to the property involved than the other. 8
82. For an apparent exception to the above rule, see Hattier v. Martinez,
197 La. 121, I So.(2d) 51 (1941), where the facts were held reviewable under
supervisory writs when one of the parents was adjudged in contempt for
violating a decree involving the custody of her minor child.
83. 202 La. 520, 12 So.(2d) 258 (1943).
84. Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.(2d) 1 (1943).
85. Accord: Sturges v. Kendall, 2 La. Ann. 565 (1847).
86. Accord: Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle Grove Syrup Co., 175
La. 969. 144 So. 730 (1932).
87. 202 La. 1011, 13 So.(2d) 332 (1943).
88. In this case it was clear that the defendant showed a far greater
right to the property. He had possessed peacefully, as owner, for eight years
prior to the suit.
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Martin-Owsley, Incorporated v. Philip Freitag, Inc.,8" affirm-
ed the well settled rule that a writ of attachment issued on im-
proper citation cannot be corrected by other process. Plaintiff's
only remedy is to start anew. He must file a new petition and
"apply to the court for an alias writ, which can issue only upon
making a new oath, securing a new order, and making a new
bond."9'0 This case also recognized the rule that a defendant can-
not champion the rights of an intervenor and make a defense
open only to him.
In Wall v. Close, Director of Finance,91 the plaintiff applied
for and obtained a temporary injunction under Act 29 of 1924.92
The defendant then obtained a suspensive appeal from the order
granting the injunction. The court correctly held that a suspen-
sive appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction is no
different from any other suspensive appeal. The enforcement of
the injunction is stayed until the appeal is passed on by the ap-
pellate court."8
Extraordinary Writs
Mandamus, the most commonly used extraordinary writ, was
involved in only two cases decided by the supreme court at its
last term. In the first94 relator sought a writ of mandamus to di-
rect a judge to proceed with the trial of his case. Stated as tersely
as possible, the facts were that the supreme court had ordered
Honorable Henry L. Himel to hold court in the Twenty-Fifth Ju-
dicial District until further notice. This case was heard by him
by authority of the above order. Before he could render a deci-
sion, however, the governor of the state appointed a judge to fill
the vacant judgeship. In rendering the writ of mandamus per-
emptory the court held that the appointment did not oust the
judge of jurisdiction to decide this case; that having been ap-
pointed by judicial order, his jurisdiction could be divested only
by equally competent authority, not by inference or collateral pro-
89. 202 La. 554, 12 So.(2d) 270 (1943).
90. Pugh v. Flannery, 151 La. 1063, 1069, 92 So. 699, 702 (1922). Accord:
Bass v. Baskowitz, 170 La. 779, 129 So. 201 (1930).
91. 201 La. 986, 10 So.(2d) 779 (1942).
92. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2078-2083.
93. Contra: Keegan v. Board of Commissioners, 154 La. 639, 98 So. 50
(1923). Note, however, that this case was decided one year before the in-junction statute involved in the principal case was passed. Compare Frank
Melat, Consolidated v. Cooper, 149 So. 468 (La. App. 1933), holding that when
the temporary Injunction is dissolved by, a final judgment on the merits, it
remains in full force, pending a suspensive appeal.
94. Folse v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 201 La. 1048, 10 So.(2d) 892
(1942).
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ceedings 5 In the second case to involve mandamus,96 relator
sought to be reinstated as an officer in respondent corporation.
Here again the recognized rule was followed that a relator must
always exhaust his remedies provided for in the corporation be-
fore he can resort to mandamus for reinstatement.
State ex rel. Davis v. Bankston 7 involved quo warranto pro-
ceedings, in which relator alleged that the respondents had been
illegally elected as officers of the Dairy Farmers' Protective
League, Incorporated. The court dismissed the proceedings, how-
ever, holding that the cause of action had abated, since the terms
of office of all three respondents had expired at this time. 8
Real Actions
This field of procedure produced four cases, none of which
shed any new light on the subject. In Pierce v. Hunter"9 the plain-
tiff instituted a petitory action and the defendant set up ten years
prescription acquirendi causa. The court recognized that a quit-
claim deed could be the foundation of ten years good faith pre-
scription, °10 but dismissed defendant's plea because the deed on
its face was not translative of the property involved."0 1
Bolding v. Veith,1 02 mentioned previously under conservative
writs, applied the elementary rule that a party who has possessed
as owner for a period of one year can be dislodged only by a pe-
titory action.
The case of Realty Operators, Incorporated v. State Mineral
Board'0 involved an action in jactitation, in which the defendant
claimed title to the land in question. In rendering a judgment for
the plaintiff the recognized rule in such actions was applied once
again; namely, that an action in jactitation is transformed into a
petitory action when the defendant alleges title in himself. Thus
he can recover only through the strength of his own title, not
through any defects that may exist in the plaintiff's title.
95. Accord: Duson, Curator v. Dupr6, 32 La. Ann. 896 (1880).
96. State ex rel. Willis v. General Longshore Workmen, Inc., 202 La. 277,
11 So.(2d) 589 (1942).
97. 202 La. 920, 13 So.(2d) 266 (1943).
98. The court intimated, by dicta, that had the proceedings been insti-
tuted against the corporation instead of the three officers thereof, the suit
would not have abated, since it was the method of election that was con-
tested.
99. 202 La. 900, 13 So.(2d) 259 (1943).
100. Perkins v. Wisner, 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493 (1930); Dupuy v. Joly,
197 La. 19, 200 So. 806 (1941).
101. Art. 3474, et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
102. 202 La. 1011, 13 So.(2d) 332 (1943).
103. 202 La. 398, 12 So.(2d) 198 (1943).
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. In the only other case to involve a real action,"" the court's
past jurisprudence was followed to the effect that an owner of a
servitude (mineral rights, in this case) is not a necessary party
to a petitory action against the owner of the land. Therefore the
court held that he was not obliged to join in an appeal from an
adverse judgment in such an action, in order to reap the benefit
of a reversal on appeal.
Succession Procedure
Succession of Lanata °5 was a very interesting case from the
standpoint of procedure. Here the testamentary executor was
recognized and confirmed by the probate court, obtained letters
of administration, and proceeded to administer the succession.
Two months thereafter the court, ex proprio motu, issued an or-
der removing him as executor and appointing the Hibernia Na-
tional Bank as administrator pro tempore and ad interim. Later
the appointment of the Hibernia Bank was revoked and the ex-
ecutor reinstated, whereupon the Hibernia Bank proceeded by
rule to have respondent's reinstatement revoked. In affirming the
executor's reinstatement the court applied the general rule that
administrators can be removed only by petition and citation in a
direct action brought for such a purpose, and held that this rule
was likewise applicable to executors. Therefore, although the
Hibernia Bank had been illegally removed as administrator pro
tempore and ad interim, they had never been validly appointed.
The original order removing the executor had been absolutely
null and void since made ex proprio motu by the court.106
Concursus Proceedings
Only one case involved concursus proceedings. In that case
07
a fund representing a one-eighth royalty interest was deposited
in the registry of the court. One of the claimants, the state min-
eral board, then filed exception to the court's jurisdiction ratione
materiae, alleging that concursus proceedings can be brought only
at the domicile of the interpleader. In this case the fund had been
104. Jackson v. Gulf Refining Co., 201 La. 721, 10 So.(2d) 593 (1942).
105. 203 La. 981, 14 So.(2d) 785 (1943).
•106. For an apparent exception to the rule that administrators and exec-
utors can only be removed by suits commenced with petition and citation
and conducted in the usual form, see Succession of Feray, 31 La. Ann. 727
(1879). Here the executor was removed by operation of the law when he
failed to post security for an amount due a creditor of the succession within
thirty days after ordered by the court to do so.
107. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14
So.(2d) 61 (1943).
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deposited in the registry of the court that had jurisdiction over
the property involved. In affirming the district court's decision
overruling the exception, the supreme court held that when a
concursus proceeding is brought to distribute the proceeds from
an oil or gas well, it may be properly brought at the domicile of
the interpleader or the parish in which the well is located.
Miscellaneous
One case involved an appeal from a civil service committee
order" 8 (as provided for by Act 253 of 1940109) removing from
office a member of a municipal police department. No points of
procedure, noteworthy of mention, were involved, however.
In Bourgeois v. Bourgeois"° the plaintiff sought to have a
sale of property declared a simulation. The court denied the
prayer, however, holding that "evidence which merely casts sus-
picion is insufficient to set the sale aside." '11 1
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abdalla1 2 pre-
sented an interesting case from the standpoint of judicial bonds.
Here the plaintiff sought to have an indemnity bond, in which
the defendant was named as principal, cancelled. The bond had
been given by the defendant as security for the usufruct which
she held on her minor child's share of his deceased father's estate.
She defended on the ground that the bond was a judicial bond,
and therefore could not be cancelled. The court stated that such
a usufruct, when created by the operation of the law, is a legal
usufruct and any bond that may be given as security therefor is
a judicial bond, not subject to cancellation. But since the usu-
fruct in this case was established, and the amount of the bond
determined, by a compromise outside of court between the de-
fendant and her deceased husband's major children, the bond
108. Pettit v. Reitzell, 202 La. 12, 11 So.(2d) 13 (1942). Defendant was
tried and removed from office as chief of police of Monroe, Louisiana, and
appealed to the district court of that parish. The district court reversed the
Civil Service Commission and reinstated him in office. On certiorari the su-
preme court reversed the district court, holding that appeals from such de-
cisions are limited to the determination of whether the accused was removed
in good faith and for just cause; and that the grounds on which the appeal
is based must be stated in the appellant's petition. Therefore, since the ap-
pellant had failed to set out any facts in his petition from which it might be
determined that the commission had not dismissed him in good faith and
for just cause, the district court was without authority to try the appeal.
109. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6282.1-6282.26.
110. 202 La. 578, 12 So.(2d) 278 (1943).
111. 202 La. 578, 590, 12 So.(2d) 278, 282 (1943).
112. 203 La. 999, 14 So.(2d) 815 (1943).
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given was only a contractual bond and could be cancelled for just
cause shown.
In the case of Johnston v. Burton" a sale made to effect a
partition of some real estate was sought to be rescinded inter alia
on the ground that the court that had ordered the sale lacked
jurisdiction over part of the property involved. The defendant
admitted that the sale was void as to the property located out-
side the jurisdiction of the court, since it was not contiguous
with the property over which the court did have jurisdiction.
But defendant strongly contended that the sale was valid as to
the property lying within the jurisdiction. Since the property had
been sold in globo, the court held, however, that the whole sale
was void. A different result would have undoubtedly been reach-
ed had the sale of the property not been made in globo.
The last case to be considered from the past year's jurispru-
dence is the case of State v. Coco."' There the defendant was con-
victed of shooting with the intent to kill, and appealed, alleging
reversible error in the jury's failure to state "with a dangerous
weapon" in its verdict. In affirming the lower court's decision the
supreme court held that a gun is presumed to be a dangerous
weapon, and therefore the omission was a harmless one."'
113. 202 La. 152, 11 So.(2d) 513 (1942).
114. 203 La. 424, 14 So.(2d) 45 (1943).
115. Cf. State v. Curry, 174 La. 287, 140 So. 480 (1932), distinguished in
principal case, where it was held reversible error when the phrase "with a
dangerous weapon" was omitted from the verdict.
